

‘The Hour Has Come at the Pit’:

The Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party

Democracy, 1982 – 1991

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ABSTRACT

The study of civil society’s role in pro-democracy movements in sub-Saharan Africa has generally neglected the underlying motivations informing mass participation in such movements. The role of Zambia’s mineworkers and their union in the 1990-91 Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) is an important example of such participation. Frederick Chiluba’s accession to the MMD leadership and to the Zambian Presidency rested on his leadership of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which was in the vanguard of opposition to the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) from the late 1970s. Chiluba’s authority, however, was based on the resonance of his critique of UNIP, in particular its implementation of structural adjustment policies, with urban workers. Mineworkers’ willingness to challenge UNIP’s practical authority in the economically strategic copper mines was rooted in the failure of the post-colonial political settlement to adequately meet their expectations for social and economic change. Their resultant discontents led some to participate in ZCTU-organised underground political opposition in the late 1980s, which provided Chiluba with an unrivalled support base in the MMD. Mineworkers resisted the co-option of their union into UNIP structures, utilising rank-and-file organisation to challenge and to remove leaders perceived as close to the ruling party. The consciousness that informed this participation – a distrust of leadership, a reliance on workplace and community-based self-mobilisation, and a belief in their right to adequate recompense for their harsh and nationally important labour – was, in mineworkers’ support for the MMD, abandoned in favour of a belief that a political party led by a trade unionist would address their expectations. The experience of Zambia’s mineworkers provides instructive parallels with the dilemmas facing unions engaged in political alliances in southern Africa and beyond.

1. Introduction

The debate over the relative importance of states and civil society organisations in shaping political change in post-colonial Africa has, over the past thirty years, fluctuated in (often belated) recognition of the evidence on the ground. In the 1970s, as one-party states and military regimes were established in much of sub-Saharan Africa, many political scientists believed that hegemonic and powerful states would be, for good or ill, the engine of economic and social development. Contemporaneous studies identified few effective challenges to the control over Zambia of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP).¹ However, the pro-democracy movements of the early 1990s provided a practical demonstration of the capacity of organisations such as churches and trade unions to organise effective opposition to such apparently powerful states. A welcome emphasis on such initiatives dovetailed with a donor-influenced liberalisation agenda that questioned the capability of African states to achieve economic development. Such approaches tended to unproblematically apply definitions of 'civil society' developed in the Eastern European context to different political movements in Africa.

Some researchers did seek to understand the social basis of such movements, for example the prominent role of trade unions in Zambia's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).² Zambia's labour movement had been identified as the *de facto* political opposition to the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) since the early 1980s.³ Throughout that decade, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), led by Chairman General Frederick Chiluba, offered a consistent challenge to UNIP supremacy, and a critique of the one-party state's inability to solve Zambia's economic problems. This culminated in its vital organisational and leadership role in the democratic movement of 1990, and in the MMD's defeat of UNIP in 1991, under the multi-party system for which the ZCTU had successfully campaigned, and led by Chiluba, who was elected MMD and Zambian President. However, trade union support for a party that advocated and implemented a programme of radical economic liberalisation led some to argue that the ZCTU's critique of UNIP's state-based economic model had always been based on a 'business-oriented', pro-capitalist approach.⁴

This article demonstrates that during the 1980s, the ZCTU consistently criticised UNIP's implementation of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation policies. The labour movement attacked the increasing influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank over the Zambian economy, and the close relationship between multinational capital and the management of state-owned corporations. This analysis found widespread resonance amongst urban Zambians. Contrary to their misleading portrayal by Bates and Collier as UNIP's core constituency, urban Zambians were in the forefront of opposition to UNIP's attempts to implement adjustment programmes.⁵ In 1986-7 and again in 1990, they rejected the implementation of such programmes through riots and strikes that reversed Government policies and undermined UNIP's hegemony. Periodic attempts at the incorporation of organisations representing urban Zambians into UNIP structures did not reflect their status as part of the party's constituency, but rather demonstrated the opposite – that they were dangerous and effective opponents that needed to be silenced.

Nordlund and Rakner separately found that the union movement's capacity to maintain its organisational autonomy from UNIP, based in its members' strategic economic position, enabled it to play such a prominent role in the MMD.⁶ They also identified the importance of membership pressure on union leaders in defending this autonomy. Neither, however, attempted to research the actions taken by local union activists and members to ensure such a stance, nor their motivations for doing so, a tendency consistent with most of the extensive literature on Zambia's workers over the last forty years.⁷ This paper analyses the complex interaction and conflict between the members and officials of the mineworkers' union over its political role, enabling the perspective of local union officials and shop stewards to be expressed for the first time.

In seeking to understand the ways in which mineworkers influenced the labour movement's role in challenging and then removing Zambia's one-party state, this paper rejects a tendency to see mineworkers as a single homogenous unit that thought and acted uniformly.⁸ It also rejects the narrowing of political ideas and actions to those self-consciously concerned with political institutions. Mineworkers' political actions and consciousness were informed by their values, and their powerful sense of collective identity. The basis for mineworkers' participation in industrial and community-based activities designed to improve (or prevent the decline of) their living standards lay in a consciousness of their unwarranted exploitation, the inequitable distribution of the revenue generated by their hazardous labour, and the importance of this labour in the strategically important copper mining industry and through it, national development.

The establishment of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 1982 led to the increased use of mine revenue to underwrite the one-party state and to enrich UNIP leaders. Widespread discontent amongst mineworkers with the resultant impact on their living conditions led most to believe that the removal of the state from their industry would enable these conditions to be improved. As the economic crisis worsened, as state intervention in their industry and union increased, and as industrial action proved insufficient to prevent a decline in their standards of living, mineworkers came to believe that their economic discontents could only be addressed by political change.

The effective expression of mineworkers' expectations and enduring grievances rested on the autonomous organisation of union branches, enabled by the continuity of workplace and living space in the mine townships. This was reinforced by the activity of miners' wives, who brought their particular concerns to the attention of mine management. Mineworkers elected local leaders who resisted state repression, overcame MUZ's undemocratic structures in order to challenge and replace the union's leadership, and to provide a vital organisational base to the multi-party movement of 1990-91. Mineworkers did not, however, generate a self-consciously independent articulation of these interests at the time when Chiluba followed international ideological fashion and donor pressure in accepting the policies of economic liberalisation that he had hitherto rejected. In following their leaders into the MMD, mineworkers surrendered the union-based autonomy that had enabled them to resist UNIP hegemony since Independence.

Bartlett has argued that the MMD was always dominated by business elites and was not an effective representative of labour and other popular interests.⁹ Whilst he rightly challenges the idea that the MMD was primarily the political representative of 'civil society' (itself an inevitably problematic concept), it is equally simplistic to view it simply as a new representative of elites. Rather, as was the case with nationalist organisations thirty years before, the MMD was an uneasy coalition of interests, of which organised labour was a significant component, particularly in enabling the transition to multi-party democracy. The contradictory tendencies in the movement reflected the variegated and ultimately conflictual ideas amongst Zambians of what a post-UNIP state would mean.

2. Background (1950 – 1981)

The political autonomy of the labour movement, and the mineworkers' union in particular, was a concern of nationalist organisations from the 1950s. Unionists refused to submit to the political direction of nationalist organisations in the campaign for political and economic liberation. Following Independence in 1964, control of trade unions was a primary aim of the new UNIP government.¹⁰ Legislation passed in 1965 significantly limited the autonomy of member unions, and severely limited workers' capacity to take legal industrial action.

The general weakness of the labour movement enabled UNIP to present itself as the paternalistic protector of Zambian workers against private foreign capital. However, the mineworkers' union, well-funded and organised, and with a history of successful industrial action, initially evaded co-option into the ZCTU. UNIP sought to control the union through branch elections in 1965, but mineworkers generally rejected candidates endorsed by UNIP. The union leadership complied with state pressure to restrict pay demands, but ordinary mineworkers organised an unofficial strike in April 1966 that secured a significant pay increase. A second strike that year led to the detention of branch leaders, and an increased urgency in UNIP's efforts to control the union and its members.

From 1967, a newly elected Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) leadership was prepared to limit demands to that which could be delivered within UNIP's model of economic development. This increased discontent amongst mineworkers, and led to challenges to the MUZ leadership in 1970-71 that were only defeated by the detention of local rank-and-file leaders. Mineworkers' resultant disillusionment with UNIP was demonstrated by their significant support for the short-lived United Progressive Party (UPP), which broke away from UNIP in 1971, before the declaration of the one-party state in 1972-3. UNIP increased legislative control over the union movement with the 1971 Industrial Relations Act (IRA), effectively banning all strikes. President Kaunda presented mine nationalisation in 1969 as a progressive step towards economic independence, and argued that with nationalisation, 'for a union to push a claim against the State is to push a claim against the people...'¹¹ The Zambian state purchased 51% of the two foreign-owned mining corporations, which nevertheless retained control over labour relations. Evidence suggests that mineworkers associated nationalisation with a decline in their working and living standards.¹²

The IRA and the one-party state substantially curtailed industrial militancy. The decline in strike levels, and the ZCTU's public loyalty, appeared to demonstrate UNIP hegemony over the working-class.¹³ However, from the early 1970s, the first elected ZCTU leadership publicly reflected workers' discontent with the rising cost of living and shortages of essential commodities. Challenges to MUZ's leadership, stifled by state repression, continued to be expressed by branch officials. With the repression of overt industrial action, mineworkers (and their wives) turned, as their colonial-era predecessors had done, to community-based methods of strikes and protests.¹⁴

As the fall in international copper prices destroyed the basis of the Zambian economy from the mid 1970s, unions failed to secure pay and conditions acceptable to their members. Under pressure from mineworkers facing declining living standards, MUZ leaders were increasingly forced to express aspects of their discontents. In 1980-81, conflict over the reorganisation of local government in mine townships culminated in a series of strikes, the suspension of union leaders from UNIP, and the detention of some of them. This conflict firmly established the labour movement as the most effective opposition to UNIP.

3. Union opposition to structural adjustment

By the 1980s, the ZCTU and its affiliates, strengthened by a significant investment in organisation, training and resources, enabled increasingly effective industrial representation.¹⁵ ZCTU Chairman General Chiluba and Secretary General Newstead Zimba were increasingly critical of UNIP's implementation of structural adjustment policies. The Zambian economy, dependent on the generally unprofitable copper mines and on donor funding, declined substantially in the 1980s. Per capita income fell from \$630 in 1981 to \$200 in 1987, and increasingly thereafter.¹⁶ Government revenue fell by 30% between 1974 and 1984.¹⁷

Whilst implementation of structural adjustment was partly forced on UNIP by its donor dependency, the logic of such policies led to increased attacks on industrial militancy. In 1982, President Kaunda condemned illegal strikes that scared away prospective foreign investors.¹⁸ The ZCTU consistently demanded compensatory pay demands to match inflation, placing the labour movement in conflict with International Financial Institution (IFI) demands for the removal of price controls and the imposition of pay limits.¹⁹ In 1983, the ZCTU General Council declared, 'the control and management of this country's economy has been shifted on to foreign international financiers.'²⁰ Zimba approvingly cited successful protests against price de-controls elsewhere in Africa, declaring that 'the possible actions at workers disposal during such situations were strike, go-slow or work-to-rule, demonstrations etc.'²¹

In 1985, an extension of the IMF agreement increased conditionality and liberalised exchange control via an auction system.²² Most price controls were removed and inflation soared.²³ Whilst Kaunda called on labour leaders to educate workers to maintain industrial peace, the ZCTU called for a wage rise to be fixed against the US dollar.²⁴ Chiluba subsequently condemned the IMF for putting African governments on collision course with their peoples.²⁵ In December 1986, following the doubling of the price of 'breakfast' mealie meal consumed by most urban Zambians, panic buying

sparked widespread looting and rioting in Copperbelt towns.²⁶ In Kitwe's mine townships where the disturbances started, mineworkers rioted alongside family members and residents of informal settlements.²⁷ Such evidence refutes Simutanyi's claim that unionised workers did not widely participate in these riots, because they represented a 'privileged' section of the working-class.²⁸ ZCCM's limited sale of subsidised mealie meal was insufficient to feed extended mineworkers' households. Miners' kin, frustrated with their inability to find employment, were prominent in the rioting. Their concerns, however, were not different to those of the mineworkers, who were culturally obliged to feed their relatives. Looters displayed the political nature of their action by targeting state stores, and attacking UNIP and Government offices.²⁹

Food subsidies were immediately restored following the rioting, in which 15 people were killed. Zambia, Chiluba declared, was the only 'socialist' state implementing monetarist economic policies and strategies.³⁰ Major strikes now took place, as workers demanded pay increases to offset inflation.³¹ Kaunda claimed that 'the initiators of the strikes were politically motivated.'³² Ultimately however, popular discontent proved more influential than the IMF. On May Day 1987, Kaunda announced the scrapping of the auction system; the exchange rate was fixed, and the price of essential goods frozen. The World Bank concluded:

The early demise...of the adjustment package imposed by the IMF resulted from an unrealistic...assumption that the majority of middle and lower income urban Zambians would tolerate pauperisation...³³

Although a 'New Economic Recovery Programme' (NERP) was introduced, UNIP continued to implement market reforms. In 1989, a new agreement between the IMF and World Bank failed to arrest economic decline.³⁴ Newstead Zimba criticised the Government's rapprochement with the IMF:

The Workers and their leaders are not prepared to take bitter pills on the I.M.F. again. The conditions so offered made people's lives difficult to sustain...We should not sell our Independence to the International financial institutions.³⁵

4. Capital and labour in ZCCM

The establishment of ZCCM in 1982 was largely driven by Zambia's donors; the IMF provided major loans for the company. With low copper prices and production costs rising, ZCCM made no substantial profits (and frequent losses) from stagnant copper output during the 1980s.³⁶ ZCCM sought to address its unprofitability through periodic cost cutting: recruitment was restricted, capital expenditure was deferred; and workplace discipline was consistently increased.³⁷ The IFIs' influence was made clear to MUZ:

the performance of the Mines in the next five years was of crucial importance both to the Company and the Nation as a whole...The World Bank had people going round our Divisions checking on how we were implementing the various measures we had pledged to implement.³⁸

In practice, ZCCM created greater opportunities for the political manipulation of mine revenues.³⁹ Foreign currency borrowed by ZCCM funded politically prestigious projects, and luxury consumption by senior politicians.⁴⁰ The ZCTU and MUZ criticised the manipulation of the company's creditworthiness.⁴¹ MUZ National Chairman Timothy Walamba claimed that mineworkers were making a disproportionate sacrifice for ZCCM's cost cutting.⁴² Many mineworkers recall the creation of ZCCM as the start of political interference in the mines, leading to a harsher industrial climate. George Lombe remembers:

Government was there, taking away the money, never reinvesting. Meaning that it now became a threat to our jobs. Those of us who were able to see that, stood up and spoke...against it. We wanted money to be ploughed back in the industry so that more jobs could be generated.⁴³

Cost cutting prompted accelerated Zambianisation, the replacing of skilled expatriates with Zambians.⁴⁴ Promoted mineworkers complained that Zambianisation failed to meet their expectations of fair advancement and equal pay. Clerks in Luanshya's Personnel Department complained:

we are being used like experimental tools. We are regarded to be essential workers but the Personnel Department has turned a blind eye on us... Zambianisation in Personnel Department hasn't done a thing for us.⁴⁵

Complainants bemoaned their declining living standards:

our salaries are peanuts on which we cannot depend. We have to utilise our normal off-days and hours to go into the bush to cultivate and subsidise our meagre "salaries"... Workers are not machines and treating them in this way does not augur well for industrial peace and stability...⁴⁶

5. Strikes and community-based conflict, 1982 – 1989

Nationalisation and the IRA had severely restricted the practical potential for workplace-based industrial action. However, the relative autonomy of mine townships, managed by the mine companies and policed by its security forces rather than those of the state, provided a space in which a community-based form of local union organisation was able to develop. Local union offices, based in mine townships (where the vast majority of mineworkers were resident) rather than the mine itself, provided bases for the coordination and mobilisation of local campaigns, outside the effective control of the state, the mine company, and the national union leadership. Mineworkers' wives, who had played an active role in mobilising local industrial action since the 1950s, played an important part in defining and organising such initiatives.

In the early 1980s, a younger generation of more educated branch officials emerged as the leadership of township-based organisation, and was increasingly prepared to publicly challenge UNIP's framework of industrial relations. Alex Lungu, Nchanga Branch Chairman from 1982, sought to re-define the illegal strike:

Chairman Comrade Lungu stressed that as in most cases it was the Management that provoked the situation...such a strike should not be termed as illegal by [sic – but] legal. He pointed out that people were saying a legal strike was that sanctioned [sic] by both the Union and the Management, “where on earth will you find such a strike?”...a Union without the right to strike was meaningless for a strike was a workers’ loudest language.⁴⁷

Local MUZ leaders were monitored by intelligence agents.⁴⁸ According to George Mukoma, Konkola Branch Chairman from 1990:

when you stand up as a Union official...you’d be very much aware that you got...the Government intelligence wing...being a public meeting, even police officers were coming there...So each time you tried to criticise a certain policy...I was called on four occasions to the police station. To try to give out the information, where I got that information and so on. And my most [important] weapon was...if miners hear that I’m at the police station they’ll go on strike. So they...released me.⁴⁹

Local officials accepted that conflict with both ZCCM and the Government was inevitable:

you cannot be a friend to management, as a trade unionist. You cannot be a friend to Government, as a trade unionist. Because they will never authorise you to go on strike. The fight that the unions have is the fight against the Government. And the fight the Government is having on the union, is to make sure that they are not strengthened, they are suppressed.⁵⁰

Such positions brought local leaders into conflict with the national leadership. Nkana branch leaders were removed after criticising Walamba for siding with management.⁵¹ Nchanga Branch ‘...shopstewards expressed doubt about the presence of democracy in the union...They accused the [MUZ Supreme] Council of having disregarded members in decision making...’⁵² Walamba’s approach was unfavourably contrasted to Chiluba’s articulation of workers’ grievances. In 1985, the Luanshya Branch Chairman and Secretary were expelled after telling the Supreme Council that ‘The National Chairman was praised by...Dr Kaunda which meant he was a sell-out.’⁵³ UNIP leader Alex Shapi’s public warning that the Government would intervene to stop ‘rebel’ attacks on Walamba only confirmed mineworkers’ views:

The relationship was very cordial. Between the Government...and the Union...[Walamba] was very much in favour...of the Government...that’s what made him very unpopular...the general membership were suspicious of their leaders...So consequently they didn’t even want to follow what they were saying...They were upholding what was in the Government, [rather] than what was required from the membership.⁵⁴

Walamba was nevertheless re-elected in 1986. Interviewees report the buying of delegates’ votes with Government funds provided for this purpose.⁵⁵

Conflict in MUZ coalesced around a mining industry pension scheme, ‘Mukuba’, introduced in 1982.⁵⁶ The perception spread that Mukuba funds were being corruptly used to benefit union officials and politicians.⁵⁷ George Mukoma remembers that ‘we

[had] been cheated by Government. And we needed our money back...the word that filtered through...that Government was benefiting better than the employees themselves...'.⁵⁸ Walamba and the MUZ leadership nevertheless resolved to defend Mukuba's compulsory basis.⁵⁹ In June 1985, Chambishi miners struck, calling for Mukuba to be abolished.⁶⁰ The strike, which spread to Chibuluma and Mufulira, was directed against the union leadership, and was particularly violent. Police, having received death threats from strikers, were afraid to intervene.⁶¹ In Mufulira, branch official Mary Palesi remembers that 'we were trying to talk to [strikers] but they couldn't listen unto us...most of our officials were really beaten...'.⁶² Strikers burned the Mufulira MUZ office and looted the union's farm that had received Mukuba funding.⁶³ The strike cost ZCCM K16m in lost production. After MUZ conceded a review of the pension scheme, most strikers returned to work. When Mukuba was subsequently made voluntary, 80% of mineworkers left the scheme.⁶⁴ The strike's success reinforced mineworkers' perception that such action was necessary to have their grievances addressed. As miner Kramer Nyondo puts it, 'the Mukuba pensions board refused to refund the money. Until people went on strike. That's when the money was refunded to the miners.'⁶⁵

Following the strike, the Minister of Labour revoked the statutory deduction of MUZ subscriptions, in a characteristic attempt to punish the union for not controlling its members.⁶⁶ For the union leadership, the resultant loss of funds was potentially disastrous. However, the unpopularity of the national leadership did not lead mineworkers to reject MUZ as an institution. Following campaigning by national and local leaders, 80% of MUZ's 50,000 members completed voluntary check-off forms.⁶⁷

A subsequent struggle over the commercialisation of township services demonstrated not only divisions within MUZ, but also the centrality of mineworkers' wives in defending community services. In 1987, mine hospitals and schools were hived off from ZCCM into a separate company, the Medical Education Trust (MET). In 1987, MET introduced medical fees for some township residents. Whilst MUZ initially accepted MET, it was unpopular amongst mineworkers and their families. In October 1989, miners' wives in Kitwe protested against the fees.⁶⁸ On one occasion, 500 women, some wearing their husbands' overalls and helmets, besieged ZCCM's central office. As the *Times of Zambia* reported, 'The women, unmoved by the presence of armed police, chanted slogans and danced around the policemen, waving branches and calling for the abolition of MET.'⁶⁹ The wives threatened to picket to prevent miners going to work and, blaming MUZ for agreeing to MET, 'roughed up' union officials.⁷⁰ Ten women were arrested. Whilst management representatives called on MUZ to counsel 'their members to persuade their wives to stop the demonstrations', branch officials argued that 'protesting house wives and their dependants were an integral part of the mining community and therefore could not be isolated from Mine employees.'⁷¹ MUZ subsequently negotiated the abolition of MET in 1991.

6. Underground political organisation

The food riots of 1986, and the resultant reversal of Government policy, revealed the one-party state's vulnerability to popular pressure. From this time, organised

opposition to UNIP in the mine townships appears to have increased. Evidence of such activity, whilst limited primarily to interviews, nevertheless appears sufficiently extensive to conclude that a significant number of mineworkers, particularly local MUZ officials, met secretly with other activists to discuss how to remove UNIP from power.⁷² Evelyn Musonda, Chief Shop Steward in Luanshya, was involved in such activities:

There were a lot of meetings held at different points, even during the night. Although the police were monitoring each and every movement... They would think you're in a Union meeting but then you are planning your next move. Not only in MUZ offices, even in certain houses. Or, we would go like we are going to the fields and we would meet... we'll discuss A B C D, we meet and then we plan for the next day... we were in smaller numbers: eight, ten... we had informers... But we would just tell them, we know what you are doing and should you continue, we know if this thing leaks out we'll come and burn your house.⁷³

Harrison Nkonde explains the role of the ZCTU leadership in such meetings:

a miner has to have something that can satisfy him. But those things were not forthcoming. So they [the ZCTU leadership] realised that, should we go to them [miners], and use them, obviously we'll win... you would see probably around 13.00 hours, if it is Saturday the meeting will be held, Mr Chiluba and the others will move from all the way from Ndola, using the public transport... then he will just go straight to that particular house... Members will be getting [to] that particular house one by one... they shouldn't go in a group for fear of being identified... we realised that I think the best thing that will be done to ensure that UNIP is brought down is by uniting all the workers' representative organisations. Unions should be brought together. That's how we formed. 'Gentlemen the purpose of us meeting here, is to ensure that we come up with a way forward. To ensure that we get in power. How do we get in power?' Those were the same guys who had plans. Mr Chiluba, and the rest of the ZCTU.⁷⁴

Japhet Sekwila links these initiatives to the subsequent creation of the MMD, and to the mineworkers' consciousness of their national importance:

the way that MMD started. It did not start as a... political party... this ZCTU President he knew, saying if there is a Province that I should earn support from, it's the Copperbelt. He knew that the Copperbelt is forcibly manned by the MUZ. So if he wins the support of the MUZ, he would win the support of the Province... he had [to] come straight to us... when you look at miner... it is the Copperbelt that feeds the nation...⁷⁵

Joseph Mulenga, an Nchanga shop steward, criticised Government policy in articles in the Catholic paper *Icengelo* in 1990. He was arrested by intelligence agents, and tortured at the local police station.⁷⁶ For Mulenga, the right to speak freely at public union meetings was intrinsically linked to political change:

the police had to say we have not given permission... but we had to dictate the situation and go up in the meeting... police had to come... and they lock you up. We had a spirit, actually that spirit was moving to do whatever we

want...It is actually the Union which made the Zambian people to learn politics. That is the beginning that started to pave [the] way to democracy.⁷⁷

7. Conflict within MUZ, 1988 – 1990

In 1988, Walamba and MUZ General Secretary John Sichone were unexpectedly appointed as members of UNIP's Central Committee (MCCs).⁷⁸ It is widely understood that Zimba and Chiluba had previously been offered, and declined, these positions.⁷⁹ Explaining the appointments, former Minister of Labour Frederick Hapunda told Nordlund:

MUZ was, and still is, the union to captivate...When you have a problem with the MUZ, it means that you have a problem with the whole country. The mining industry to this country is the whole lifeline...Every effort was made to try to woo them to the Party, woo them to government...There was a deliberate attempt, an obvious attempt, to alienate MUZ from the ZaCTU [ZCTU].⁸⁰

Walamba feared that 'the members outside will now be saying Mr Walamba, Mr Sichone, are sell outs...'⁸¹ Indeed, ordinary mineworkers unambiguously rejected the appointments:

Walamba we said was a sell-out, he betrayed the miners...he was there when they were formulating policies which were harsh on the miners.⁸²

miners were saying...it meant they were bought by the Government...since he was given that appointment in a one-party participatory democracy...If Kaunda suggests to say he's not going to increase miners' salaries...there is no way, he's going to say, 'Kaunda, do increase'. No. That's why miners were very annoyed. He had sold them. You see? But we were going to get nothing.⁸³

economically at that time, it was only the mines that used to produce, that used to sustain the well-being of the Government, and the national plan...if there was a work stoppage in the mine, just for five minutes, that's paralysis of the economy of the nation. So, because Mr Walamba was too vocal, the Government opted to silence him by offering that position...⁸⁴

The key test of the appointments was their impact on pay negotiations in 1989. Nchanga Branch Chairman Albert Chali found himself caught between a national leadership that had accepted a 12.5% pay increase, and a membership unwilling to do so. As he announced the increase to a public meeting, 3,000 mineworkers physically attacked the branch leadership and office. Two people were shot, and there were 31 arrests.⁸⁵ Chali confirms contemporaneous reports that 'the [rioting] miners were demanding that...Walamba should choose to remain as their union chairman or as a Central Committee member.'⁸⁶ The agreement confirmed miners' suspicions regarding the appointments, which were now criticised by the ZCTU leadership.⁸⁷

Opposition to Walamba culminated in a challenge to his leadership at the MUZ Conference in March 1990. By this time, the MMD was under construction (see below), and the position of MUZ was crucial:

everyone wanted to use Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, to achieve whatever they want to achieve...the most powerful affiliate of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions are Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. And therefore, for one to win favours of ZCTU, one has to first win the favours of the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia.⁸⁸

Walamba's challenger, Jonathan Simakuni, MUZ Deputy National Chairman, was tacitly endorsed by Chiluba, already associated with the nascent pro-democracy movement.⁸⁹ As Simakuni's supporters travelled to Livingstone, they faced scrutiny from the authorities. Evelyn Musonda:

We had boarded buses...from Luanshya...We did not know that we were being followed by the...OP [Office of the President, i.e. intelligence agents] people...Simakuni was likened to firewood, so we had this firewood on the top of the bus, all the way from the Copperbelt to Livingstone.⁹⁰

In Livingstone, Musonda was questioned by police, and her hotel room was ransacked.⁹¹ Mary Palesi, Mufulira Branch Treasurer, reveals the extent of pro-Walamba state mobilisation:

he brought in the intelligence...he sent his people to Livingstone. So those people were coming to our rooms. Walamba used to give them our room numbers...When they came to my room during the night, they knocked. I had to peep up at the window. My heart started pumping, what do I do? Now I'm caught!...What I did was, I had to leave my friend in that room, and jumped over [sic - out] the window...they were about four guys in plain clothes...two were holding their pistols. Which I saw. And the other two had AK47s...After some minutes I saw them moving to the next house...they were going into my friend's place. 'Where is Mary, we are looking for Mary? ...we're looking for that young stupid girl! Who has made our big man so miserable.' After some couple of minutes, I saw them walk forward...They went to Mr Walamba's room. 'No we haven't seen this young girl'. [Walamba:] 'No, that is the very room where she is! Go back. Make sure that she's been caught.' Again they came back...The whole night, we couldn't even sleep. They were listening to us. But nobody was caught...⁹²

At the Conference, Chiluba repeated his call for a multi-party state, and attacked Walamba's membership of the Central Committee.⁹³ Despite Walamba's claim that his appointment had strengthened relations between the Government and the labour movement, he lost the election to Simakuni.⁹⁴ UNIP's attempt to gain control over the labour movement through the manipulation of its leadership had been defeated.⁹⁵ For many in MUZ, there was an implicit association between effective trade unionism and political opposition to UNIP.

8. Labour and the MMD, 1989 - 91

Following the fall of East European Communist states in 1989, Frederick Chiluba was the first prominent Zambian to publicly declare that Zambia should consider the re-introduction of multi-partyism.⁹⁶ Kaunda conceded a referendum on multi-partyism in May 1990, but argued that it would re-ignite tribalism.⁹⁷ In June, donor pressure led to

the removal of food subsidies, and the doubling of the mealie meal price.⁹⁸ In Lusaka, 36 people died as thousands of Zambians looted and rioted in protest.⁹⁹ On the Copperbelt, teargas was used to suppress potential riots.¹⁰⁰ Subsequently, an Army Lieutenant launched an opportunistic coup attempt. Whilst this was unsuccessful, it was initially celebrated on the streets. By publicly revealing popular opposition to UNIP, these events provided a 'moment of transparency', and a significant spur to the emergent campaign for multi-party democracy.¹⁰¹

In July, multi-party advocates met in Lusaka.¹⁰² As well as unionists, these included former UNIP leaders, intellectuals, lawyers, and prominent businessmen. In August, the unregistered multi-party movement held its first rallies in Copperbelt towns, with Chiluba the most prominent speaker.¹⁰³ UNIP initially sought to prevent these meetings. In practice however, overwhelming popular support for the multi-party movement deterred UNIP from its systematic repression. Kaunda subsequently confirmed that he abandoned plans to detain Chiluba for fear of consequent unrest.¹⁰⁴ Mass rallies, enabled by the use of ZCTU and affiliate resources, helped prevent the movement's suppression during its period of ambiguous legal status. Kaunda initially postponed the planned referendum, and then declared that Zambia would hold multi-party elections in 1991.¹⁰⁵

In December 1990, the multi-party movement re-launched itself as a political party, the MMD.¹⁰⁶ In March 1991, Chiluba was elected MMD President.¹⁰⁷ Whilst the movement's unity increased its effectiveness, this meant there was little public discussion of its policies. MMD interim chairman Arthur Wina privately argued in 1991 that Chiluba's background in the labour movement enabled him to advocate economic adjustment policies without union opposition.¹⁰⁸ In November 1990, Wina assured World Bank officials that an MMD Government would honour Zambia's debt obligations.¹⁰⁹ The MMD manifesto proposed that Government would act as a facilitator rather than a participant in a 'social market' economy.¹¹⁰ In May, radically reversing his previous position, Chiluba supported privatisation and argued that it was Zambia's unhealthy political environment (rather than economic policies) that caused industrial unrest.¹¹¹ An MMD advert proclaimed, 'Across the world, authoritarian governments and centralised economies are on the run: While democracies and free markets are on the rise. Economic competition will be unprecedented and so will economic opportunities.'¹¹²

The ZCTU's decision to campaign for the return of multi-party democracy was encouraged by the Industrial Relations Act of 1990. This removed the ZCTU's statutory powers, and directed unions seeking to support a political party to establish a voluntary political fund, requiring the endorsement of two-thirds of members.¹¹³ Akwety argues, 'The demand for the restoration of multi-party politics...was directly related to the leadership's perception that the new IRA (1990) threatened the existence of the ZCTU and the organisational cohesion of the labour movement.'¹¹⁴ In December 1990, the ZCTU General Council declared:

The Act destroys all freedoms of expression and has shattered the tripartite spirit which had existed...trade unions and their workers and all peace-loving citizens of Zambia are called upon to effectively and morally support the efforts being advanced by MMD which we believe will form the next democratic government.¹¹⁵

As Akwety states, ‘The ZCTU placed its organisational network and facilities at the disposal of the MMD...’¹¹⁶ Nordlund argues:

the unions were seen as the organisational basis for the newly formed movement. By August 1990, ZaCTU [ZCTU] funding and organisational infrastructure were also made available for MMD use – instantly providing the MMD with a campaign vehicle that was widely superior to that of the ruling party.¹¹⁷

In September, Congress declared that it was no longer opposed to structural adjustment policies in principle.¹¹⁸ In May 1991, ZCTU Head of Research Ages Mukupa approvingly cited the Scandinavian system in which capital accumulation was used to create social and material prosperity for all. Mukupa argued that in a genuine democracy, capitalist development could be pursued without worrying about creating extreme inequity.¹¹⁹

9. Economic and political strikes

The removal of food subsidies in June 1990 also led to an unprecedented wave of strikes by workers seeking a compensatory wage rise.¹²⁰ In September and October, there were strikes in the motor trade, shoemaking, Zambia Breweries, bakeries and milling plants, postal services, colleges and schools, hotels, hospitals, sugar estates, and textile factories. At the time when the unregistered multi-party movement was testing its practical legality, workers’ confidence to challenge state authority appears to have risen substantially. The Minister of Labour claimed that strikes were organised by UNIP’s opponents to create anarchy and usurp political power, but security forces did not generally intervene.¹²¹

Political upheaval and pay negotiations provided an opportunity for mineworkers to express their political and economic expectations. In November, as negotiations were ongoing, workers struck at the Nchanga Open Pit.¹²² Two thousand miners demanded a 200% wage rise, rejecting the 20% increase that had reportedly been offered.¹²³ Open Pit shop stewards leading the action were in the forefront of local MMD organisation.¹²⁴ These included Sefelino Mumba, MMD District Youth Chairman:

we went to general offices to deliver the message. So that we can give more chance for our leaders to aid discussion faster than what Management could accept. There was chants now going on...political slogans. ‘The hour has come at Nchanga’.¹²⁵ ...So we went with placards...even writing to [on] our heavy vehicles ‘The hour has come’...the Superintendent – Human Resources...he came to us and said, this kind of protest is political...[They]...said now [who] has planned this?... Who’s behind it?...that’s political...it’s MMD. So, I was mentioned...¹²⁶

Three days later, Mumba was arrested and beaten by police.¹²⁷ He and 16 others were charged with incitement to strike:

The accused on 02/11/90 was found and seen addressing other employees at RTV Workshop and incited them to go on strike because the ‘Hour has come

at the Pit” and that if they did not go on strike they would be given 20% increment.¹²⁸

Mumba unsuccessfully argued in his defence that the slogans were a political act, and therefore not a breach of ZCCM regulations.¹²⁹

In the pay talks themselves, the new MUZ leadership broke with tradition by openly threatening industrial action.¹³⁰ They criticised ZCCM’s funding of political projects; the union ‘likened the Companies to a parent who fed his children on a poor diet but assisted a neighbour in procuring delicacies’, and warned that ‘they were under extreme pressure from their members and could not therefore accept an offer which was going to infuriate their members.’¹³¹ The subsequent pay agreement is today remembered as one of the greatest achieved by MUZ. The lowest paid miners received a K1,000 increase, an amount that became known as a ‘Simakuni’.¹³² The successful pay negotiations appeared to exemplify the better future that mineworkers could expect under the MMD:

people thought that...with the MMD pushing, already they are seeing changes, the Government is agreeing...that we should have annual increment...And people thought when MMD comes in then it will be easier for us...when we looked at our President [Simakuni]...we knew that he was MMD supporter. And when we looked at the Chairman General of ZCTU, as being an MMD supporter...this man, being a unionist, he must understand the plight of the workers.¹³³

10. The MUZ and MMD

Following the 1990 MUZ Conference, the new leadership declared its support for multi-party democracy. General Secretary Kossam Sheng’amo argued that the revamping of the economy required political change.¹³⁴ In January 1991, MUZ affirmed its support for MMD as a political party.¹³⁵ The union’s support for political change was linked to mineworkers’ enduring economic grievances. Simakuni’s analysis of Zambia’s political economy did not reflect the MMD leadership’s support for market economics:

Is it not shameful that...ZCCM carries the unenviable stigma of offering one of the lowest and poorest conditions of service to its local employees, than any other mining Company in the world? It is mind boggling to note that ZCCM’s top-heavy, politically inclined management at the helm of the country’s economic main stay, could after 25 years of political independence, continue to maintain two separate and highly unequal conditions of service for expatriate and senior staff, on one hand and local staff on the other, as a vestige of the colonial industrial colourbar of the 1940’s. In this unfolding political era, whose struggle and attainment this Union is proudly and closely identified with, we demand a fresh progressive approach to enterprise management and industrial relations...in which the satisfaction of workers’ needs will match the pursuit of profits, at the expense of paternalistic affiliations to Party and Government institutions and structures.

In a multinational and monopoly company dominated economy like ours, where even the state as a major employer tend[s] to be on the side of capital

in labour matters...the role of MUZ and indeed all trade unions should have to be to safeguard all round democracy, individual human and civic liberties, social justice and the rule of law...the protection and promotion of workers gains in wages, conditions of service, living and housing standards, social security and welfare after retirement, against the extremes and excesses of any future Government...

In this hard struggle, we will have to bank more and more on the strength, unity and solidarity of all workers in alliance with revolutionary intellectuals to thwart the machinations of capital in all its manifestations, colours and shapes.¹³⁶

Simakuni nevertheless spoke at MMD rallies, and was unambiguously supportive of the party.¹³⁷ In May 1991, Simakuni suddenly died.¹³⁸ Chiluba pledged that the MMD would try to establish the real cause of his death.¹³⁹ This reinforced the widespread suspicion that he had been killed by the state, still the overwhelming opinion of mineworkers today:

this thing is happening in the nation, where you see someone becomes a threat. The only option, you can't talk to him and he cannot compromise with you...is to eliminate him. His death is a political death. He was assassinated...¹⁴⁰

Miners and family members from across the Copperbelt attended Simakuni's funeral. Kramer Nyondo recalls that 'thousands of them attended the burial. All the shop stewards, from all the mines...all the MMD's supporters, they also came...It was a political rally; not like a funeral, like a burial.'¹⁴¹ Most mineworkers still believe that Simakuni's early death robbed them of a leader who would have met some of their expectations for economic and social progress.¹⁴²

Local MUZ officials played a leading role in establishing MMD organisation across the Copperbelt. Amongst many examples, Evelyn Musonda became an MMD Chair in Luanshya.¹⁴³ Albert Chali, now MMD Chingola District Vice Secretary, claims that 'the Union made it possible for MMD Government to come to power...The revolution started from the Union. Just like the revolution started before Independence, from the miners.'¹⁴⁴ At vast rallies on the Copperbelt, the MMD explained their plans for the mines. In April 1991, Chiluba told 100,000 people in Chingola that 'As for now the mines are centralised and the money they earn is being taken to Lusaka where a few individuals help themselves to it like kings. Such are some of the things we want stopped.'¹⁴⁵ The MMD attacked ZCCM inefficiency and the cost saving measures that had cut miners' jobs. Chiluba assured Zambia's 55,000 miners that all their jobs would be safe under the MMD.¹⁴⁶ Such messages resonated with the experience and aspiration of mineworkers:

it was the state which was deciding how much they can put into the running of the mines...the whole money was going to the politicians...So that's why people...thought maybe if it is privatised, maybe there'll be some changes.¹⁴⁷

they said that if we privatise the mining Company, it'll mean you miners will stay very well, your salaries...the conditions that you will be in will be very good, compared to the conditions that you have now...they said...they will create employment...¹⁴⁸

UNIP, meanwhile, tried to use the issue to gain support from mineworkers. On the eve of the election, a UNIP advert read:

Miners be warned about the MMD

Has the president of the MMD Mr Frederick Chiluba promised you improved conditions, but what do his policies say?

i) He wants to split ZCCM so that each mine runs separately.

ii) He wants to invite foreign investors for each mine.

iii) He wants to give the private investors a free hand to improve efficiency.

What does efficiency mean?

Efficiency means more profits for the shareholders.

How do shareholders achieve their profits?

i) By declaring workers redundant.

ii) By closing marginal mines such as Kabwe, Luanshya, Mufulira.

iii) By reducing expenditure on workers' welfare in amenities such as football clubs, hospitals, townships, subsidies on housing, mealie meal, water, etc.

Do you treasure your jobs?

IF YOU DO, THEN VOTE FOR UNIP AND K.K. THEY HAVE ALWAYS LOOKED AFTER YOU AND WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK AFTER YOU. TO VOTE FOR MMD IS TO VOTE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT.¹⁴⁹

The MMD made other electoral promises that won mineworkers' support:

they would build new houses, and a big market is going to be built there...And then they said a clinic was going to be built, [and] a bus station...we are going to form a cooperative, which will help those people who had no jobs.¹⁵⁰

MMD leaders promised that transport services would be improved, shortages of essential commodities would end, and food prices would be reduced.¹⁵¹ At the same time however, miners and other workers were marginalised in elections for senior MMD positions on the Copperbelt. As Bratton described, MMD leaders were selected for the Province's parliamentary seats, and wealth became increasingly necessary to secure local posts.¹⁵² MUZ shop steward George Lombe, interim MMD District Youth Chairman in Mufulira, was defeated for the permanent position by a candidate sufficiently rich to fund an election campaign.¹⁵³

In the run-up to the election, Zimba argued that workers should 'exercise maximum restraint and persuade themselves to call off any industrial action they may be contemplating'.¹⁵⁴ Following the election, MUZ expressed anger at ZCCM's refusal to increase a pay offer, but was willing to compromise in the interests of political stability:

ZCCM was just like the old UNIP Government which had lost touch with reality and failed to read the mood of the people...The new culture in the Third Republic called for an equitable distribution of resources. The Union Representatives further stated that they had begun to question the Company's attitude towards these negotiations. It was probably that the Company wanted

to draw the Union into some desperate action so that they could embarrass the new Government. They resolved not to do anything that would embarrass the new Government and pledged to continue negotiations until they reached an amicable settlement.¹⁵⁵

Days after the October 1991 election, in which Chiluba received 75% of the vote for the Presidency, and the MMD won 125 of 150 Parliamentary seats, paramilitary police raided ZCCM offices.¹⁵⁶ Investigations revealed that 25 ZCCM subsidiary companies had been established outside Zambia without legal approval. ZCCM, a senior Government official claimed, had become the personal institution of President Kaunda.¹⁵⁷ Such revelations confirmed mineworkers' perceptions regarding ZCCM, and reinforced their belief that, as MUZ President Francis Kunda optimistically put it, 'the future Government is going to liberalise the economy and privatise the mines which will ensure efficiency, accountability and productivity.'¹⁵⁸

11. Conclusion

In a context of economic decline, the Zambian one-party state's lack of effective control over the key determinants of Zambia's mono-economy, particularly the copper price, made it increasingly difficult for UNIP to address mineworkers' enduring demands. The growing economic crisis led the ruling party to assert its dominance in increasingly repressive ways. Zambia's mineworkers and their families utilised industrial and community-based direct action to challenge their declining living standards, and to resist attempts by UNIP to undermine and/or gain control of their union. In so doing, they expressed their discontents with the distribution of wealth and power in Zambian society, and the consumption of the output of their labour by a corrupt state-based elite. Despite a lack of genuine democracy in MUZ, mineworkers successfully removed a national leadership that they believed had surrendered its independence by accepting positions in UNIP's Central Committee.

In 1991, most mineworkers expected that the MMD Government, which they had played a leading role in bringing to power, would begin to address the radical decline in wages and living conditions that they had experienced during the 1980s. This was based in part on the prominent role that the wider labour movement had played in the MMD, both as pressure group and political party, symbolised by the leadership of Frederick Chiluba. It was reinforced by their significant participation in illegal underground political opposition, and subsequent MMD organisation on the Copperbelt. This participation, however, was not reflected in the effective representation of mineworkers' interests in the MMD. Neither the ZCTU nor the MUZ sought direct influence over MMD policy making, and had no explicit ideological position, nor programme of demands, to inform its relationship with the new Government. Their discontent with state administration of the economy, and the relationship with both international capital and international finance institutions that this involved, led them to accept MMD pledges that the removal of state intervention would improve salaries and living conditions, for themselves and other Zambians.

Soon after the election, President Chiluba wrote to the general secretaries of all Zambian unions, requesting their assistance in addressing Zambia's economic problems in stark terms:

It is therefore my sincere hope that you will all summon courage as leaders of our people to convince the workers to die a little so that prosperity is not overburdened with a crippling debt and an economy shattered beyond redemption.¹⁵⁹

The willingness of union leaders to accept such sacrifices on behalf of their members was to have devastating consequences for the Zambian labour movement, and mineworkers in particular, during the 1990s.¹⁶⁰ The MMD's programme of radical economic liberalisation led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of formal sector jobs and a consequent weakening of the political importance of the labour movement. The disastrous privatisation of ZCCM led to the redundancy of more than 50% of Zambia's mineworkers, and the general devastation of the mining industry. Nevertheless, this outcome was not pre-determined. The MMD was not simply the product of intellectual and business elites; it also emerged out of the diverse discontents and aspirations of millions of ordinary Zambians, amongst whom mineworkers, during the period covered by this paper, were in an unusually powerful position to express theirs.

The marginalisation of mineworkers' aspirations in the political movement they played a central role in bringing about provides obvious lessons for labour movements engaged in processes of political change elsewhere, not least in southern Africa. The leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions in creating the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000 was followed by the adoption by the MDC of neo-liberal economic policies similar to those of the MMD.¹⁶¹ This has led to a debate within the Zimbabwean labour movement, over the nature and extent of its support to the opposition party.¹⁶² In South Africa, the alliance between the African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has come under increasing strain, as the ANC Government implements largely neo-liberal economic policies rejected by the majority of union activists. Informed by these regional experiences, the Zambian labour movement has been in the vanguard of a national campaign against the privatisation of remaining state assets, and the donor-influenced reduction of public expenditure. In this context, a renewed debate over the political role of trade unions in Zambia is again questioning whether labour movements should provide direct support to politicians claiming to represent their interests, or maintain a 'syndicalist' position that restricts union activity to workplace campaigning.¹⁶³

The tendency of researchers to reach conclusions regarding the potential or actual political importance of the labour movement in Zambia without adequately assessing the motivations of ordinary union members is, unfortunately, a recurring tendency. A recent analysis of Zambian agencies for 'pro-poor change' states that "A feature of the 1990s was the relative decline in the political influence of the trade unions."¹⁶⁴ Rakner is correct that trade unions were excluded from policy-making by the administration which it helped come to power.¹⁶⁵ However, as this article has sought to explain, the political influence of the labour movement in Zambia has not generally depended on preferential access to policy-making forums, but rather on the capacity of rank-and-file members to challenge the decisions of policy makers through forms of locally organised direct action. As the current union campaigns against neo-liberalism suggest, if we are to understand the underlying dynamics informing

relations between African states and civil society organisations, it is incumbent to go beyond intellectual trends and generalisations, in order to understand the historically specific contexts in which these relationships are acted out.

¹ For example, Baylies and Szeftel's analysis of one-party elections in 1973 and 1978 suggested a lack of significant opposition to UNIP on the Copperbelt: C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'Elections in the One-Party State', in C. Gertzel (ed), C. Baylies, and M. Szeftel The Dynamics of the One-Party State, The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester University Press 1984).

² Three significant studies have explored this period: E.O. Akwety, Trade Unions and Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana (University of Stockholm, 1994); L. Rakner, Trades Unions in Processes of Democratisation: a Study of Party-Labour Relations in Zambia (Bergen, Michelsen Institute, 1992); P. Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora: Domination and Democratisation in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Uppsala University, 1996).

³ K. Woldring, 'Survey of Recent Inquiries and their Results', in K. Woldring (ed), Beyond Political Independence: Zambia's Development Predicament in the 1980s (Berlin, Mouton Publishers, 1984), p. 205.

⁴ See for example P. Gibbon, 'Structural Adjustment and Pressures Towards Multi-Partyism in sub-Saharan Africa', in Y. Bangura, P. Gibbon and A. Ofstad (eds), Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: the Politics of Economic Reform in Africa (Uppsala, Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1992); cited in Rakner, Trades Unions in Processes of Democratisation, p. 114.

⁵ R.H. Bates and P. Collier, 'The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia', in R.H. Bates and A.O. Krueger (eds), Political and Economic Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries (Oxford & Cambridge MA, Blackwell, 1993); L. Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001 (Uppsala, Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2003).

⁶ Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 297.

⁷ The most significant exception to this rule is M. Burawoy, The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines (Lusaka, UNZA Institute of African Studies, 1972).

⁸ See in particular, H.S. Meebelo, African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism (Lusaka, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1986), and R.H. Bates, Unions, Parties, and Political Development: a Study of Mineworkers in Zambia (New Haven CN & London, Yale University Press, 1971).

⁹ D.M.C. Bartlett, 'Civil Society and Democracy: a Zambian Case Study', Journal of Southern African Studies, 26, 3 (September, 2000), pp. 429-446.

¹⁰ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) LSS1/20/89, 'Trade Unions & Trades Disputes amendment, 1964-66', Cabinet Legislation Committee undated, c. October 1964.

¹¹ Zambia, Towards Complete Independence (Lusaka, Government Printers, 1969), p. 44. Emphasis in original.

¹² N.N.J. Mijere, 'The Mineworkers' Resistance to Governmental Decentralisation in Zambia: Nation-Building and Labor Aristocracy in the Third World' (PhD thesis, Brandeis University, 1985), p. 317; Basilio Kunda interview, Chingola, 7/2/2003 (series of interviews with 62 former mineworkers carried out 2002-03).

¹³ See for example, C. Gertzel, 'Labour and the State: The Case of Zambia's Mineworkers' Union', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 13, 3 (November, 1975), p. 295; International Marxist Group, Zambia: Humanist Rhetoric, Capitalist Reality Africa in Struggle Occasional Papers No.2 (London, 1975), p.21; C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'Elections in the One-Party State', in Gertzel (ed), The Dynamics of the One-Party State.

¹⁴ For colonial era parallels, see I.R. Phimister and C. van Onselen, Studies in the History of African Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe (Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1976).

¹⁵ Rakner, Trades Unions in Processes of Democratisation, passim.

¹⁶ Article, Akashambatwa Lewanika, in Sunday Times of Zambia (hereafter SToZ), 5/7/87.

¹⁷ Times of Zambia (hereafter ToZ), 24-28/7/84.

¹⁸ ToZ, 23/10/82.

¹⁹ See for example Zimba's demand that wages rise to match 100% rise in prices: ToZ, 14/1/82.

²⁰ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) LSS1/20/89, 'Trade Unions & Trades Disputes amendment, 1964-66', ZCTU General Council meeting minutes, 30/12/83.

²¹ Ibid.

²² ToZ, 22/5/85.

- ²³ SToZ, 20/10/85.
- ²⁴ ToZ, 5/10/85, 16/12/85.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 11/10/86, 29/10/86.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 10/12/86.
- ²⁷ Roy Yumbe interview, Wusakile, 7/11/2002. See also interviews with B.J. Ngulube, Kitwe, 5/11/2002; Boniface Kumwenda, Chamboli, 2/11/2002; Mwansa Chipoty, Chililabombwe, 5/2/2003; Kramer Nyondo, Kitwe, 13/9/2002.
- ²⁸ N. Simutanyi, 'Organised Labour, Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Case of Zambia', in O. Sichone and B.C. Chikulo (eds), Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic, (Harare, SAPES Books, 1996), p.164.
- ²⁹ Sefelino Mumba interview, Chingola, 15/2/2003; E. West, 'The Politics of Hope: Zambia's Structural Adjustment Programme 1985 – 1987' (PhD Thesis, Yale University, 1989), p. 383; Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 88.
- ³⁰ SToZ, 1/2/87.
- ³¹ ToZ, 5/3/87.
- ³² Ibid., 4/4/87. Nordlund argues whilst these strikes were of 'economic origin', their impact was politically significant: Organising the Political Agora, p. 91.
- ³³ World Bank Country Economics Department WPS 222/C. Colclough, The Labour Market and Economic Stabilisation in Zambia (Washington, World Bank, 1989), p. 1.
- ³⁴ ToZ, 12/10/89.
- ³⁵ MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1983-88', N.L. Zimba, address to MUZ Supreme Council (SC), 30/9/88.
- ³⁶ Zambia Mining Year Book (Special Edition), 1982-86 (Lusaka, ZCCM, 1987); ZCCM Archives 10.2.8A, 'ZCCM Annual Reports, 1985 – 1992', ZCCM Annual Report 1985.
- ³⁷ ToZ, 22/5/82.
- ³⁸ ZCCM 16.2.9C, 'GIRM Committee and related correspondence, 1986', 2nd Mines Joint Industrial Committee (MJIC) mtg, 16/5/86.
- ³⁹ J. Aron, 'Economic Policy in a Mineral-Dependent Economy: the Case of Zambia' (DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992), pp. 202-205.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 205.
- ⁴¹ ToZ, 28/4/89.
- ⁴² Ibid., 1/10/82.
- ⁴³ George Lombe interview, Mufulira, 27/2/2003. See also interviews with Patrick Kanyanta, Kitwe, 7/11/2002; Harrison Nkonde, Mufulira, 1/3/2003; John Chalwe, Chililabombwe, 12/2/2003.
- ⁴⁴ ToZ, 29/3/84.
- ⁴⁵ MUZ Luanshya, 'General Correspondence, 1980-85', Memo, All Check Point Clerks to Personnel Dept, 3/10/83.
- ⁴⁶ MUZ Nchanga, miscellaneous documents, Memo, Chief Shop Stewards and Shop Stewards Underground Mining Dept to Mgt ZCCM Nchanga Div, 30/3/90.
- ⁴⁷ MUZ Nchanga/11B, 'Public meetings, 1972-86', Mimbula-Fitula sub-Branch public mtg, Kaunda Square, 24/2/85.
- ⁴⁸ Basilio Kunda interview.
- ⁴⁹ George Mukoma interview, Chililabombwe, 11/2/2003.
- ⁵⁰ Cameron Pwele interview, Lusaka, 17/3/2003.
- ⁵¹ MUZ HO, 'MUZ Supreme Council minutes, 1981-87', SC, 22/6/84; ToZ, 7/5/84.
- ⁵² MUZ Nchanga, 'Executive Committee meetings, 1982-87', Executive Committee meeting, 7/9/82.
- ⁵³ MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1981-1987', Emergency MUZ SC, 16/11/84.
- ⁵⁴ ToZ, 14/11/84; David Ndalama interview, Chingola, 13/2/2003.
- ⁵⁵ B.J. Ngulube interview. See also interviews with Boniface Kumwenda; Oswell Munyenembe, Mufulira, 26/2/2003; Cameron Pwele; David Ndalama.
- ⁵⁶ ToZ, 22/3/82, 8/5/82.
- ⁵⁷ Mary Palesi interview, Ndola, 7/3/2003.
- ⁵⁸ George Mukoma interview.
- ⁵⁹ MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1983-88', SC, 13/5/85; MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1981-87', MUZ Committee to review Mukuba Pension Scheme, mtg 18/5/85.
- ⁶⁰ ToZ, 2/6/85.
- ⁶¹ Ibid.
- ⁶² Mary Palesi interview.

- ⁶³ ZCCM 1.9.4D, 'ACME, MJIC meetings, 1983-87', ACME – MUZ special mtg, 1/6/85.
- ⁶⁴ MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1981-1987', SC, 13/6/85.
- ⁶⁵ Kramer Nyondo interview.
- ⁶⁶ ToZ, 21/1/85; Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 87.
- ⁶⁷ ToZ, 6/9/85, 27/8/86.
- ⁶⁸ ToZ, 5/10/89.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 10/10/89.
- ⁷⁰ ZCCM 1.7.1B, 'GIRMs papers, 1989-90', Copper Industry Service Bureau (hereafter CISB), 'Summary of Protests by Women at Nkana Division', 7/10/89; see also ToZ, 11/10/89.
- ⁷¹ MUZ Nkana, 'Branch officials meetings with management', Kitwe Senior District Governor, Senior MET and Nkana Division officials, Nkana and Mindolo MUZ mtg 9/10/89; MUZ Nkana, 'Complaint Files, 1985-87', Nkana Branch Chairman Jackson Kaoma, Emergency Branch Executive Committee, 7/10/89.
- ⁷² Interviews: B.J. Ngulube; Boniface Kumwenda.
- ⁷³ Evelyn Musonda interview, Kitwe, 27/12/2002.
- ⁷⁴ Harrison Nkonde interview.
- ⁷⁵ Japhet Sekwila interview, Mufulira, 25/2/2003.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Joseph Mulenga interview, Kitwe, 8/11/2002.
- ⁷⁸ See for example, MUZ HO, 'Supreme Council minutes, 1983-88', National Chairman opening remarks to SC, 15/7/88.
- ⁷⁹ See for example, Akwety, Trade Unions and Democratisation, pp. 56-7.
- ⁸⁰ Frederick Hapunda, Minister of Labour 1982-86, quoted in Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 112.
- ⁸¹ Timothy Walamba interview, Kitwe, 6/11/2002.
- ⁸² Agnes N'gandwe interview, Mufulira, 26/2/2003.
- ⁸³ Edward Kabundi interview, Chililabombwe, 18/2/2003.
- ⁸⁴ Borries Ntankula interview, Kitwe, 5/11/2002.
- ⁸⁵ ToZ, 9/8/89.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., 8/8/89.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., 30/12/89.
- ⁸⁸ George Lombe interview.
- ⁸⁹ Timothy Walamba interview.
- ⁹⁰ Evelyn Musonda interview. 'Simakuni' was likened to 'inkuni', Bemba for 'firewood', symbolising that he was a 'firebrand' union leader. The use of a Bemba term for Simakuni, a Tonga, is indicative of the cross-ethnic discourse prevalent in MUZ.
- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² Mary Palesi interview.
- ⁹³ George Mukoma interview.
- ⁹⁴ MUZ Nkana, Miscellaneous documents, MUZ 1990 Biannual Conference, Report to Nkana Main Branch Executive; ToZ, 19/3/90; MUZ Mufulira/5/A/2/90 – 'Biennial Conference, Correspondence file, 1990-1998', MUZ 1990 Biannual Conference.
- ⁹⁵ Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 99.
- ⁹⁶ SToZ, 31/12/89; Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 93.
- ⁹⁷ SToZ, 13/5/90; ToZ, 14/5/90.
- ⁹⁸ ToZ, 20/6/90.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid., 26/6/90.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 101.
- ¹⁰² ToZ, 21/7/90.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid., 6/8/90.
- ¹⁰⁴ Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, p. 106.
- ¹⁰⁵ ToZ, 26/7/90, 25/9/90.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 21/12/90, 10/1/91.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 2/3/91.
- ¹⁰⁸ Interview with Arthur Wina, Lusaka, July 1991.
- ¹⁰⁹ ToZ, 21/11/90.
- ¹¹⁰ Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, p. 68; ToZ, 14/2/91.
- ¹¹¹ ToZ, 27/10/90; SToZ, 26/5/91.

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- ¹¹² ToZ, 24/6/91.
- ¹¹³ ToZ, 27/12/90.
- ¹¹⁴ Akwety, Trade Unions and Democratisation, p. 102.
- ¹¹⁵ SToZ, 30/12/90.
- ¹¹⁶ Akwety, Trade Unions and Democratisation, p. 65.
- ¹¹⁷ Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora, pp. 104-5.
- ¹¹⁸ ToZ, 6/6/90.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid., 18/5/91.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid., 16/6/90.
- ¹²¹ Ibid., 6/10/90.
- ¹²² SToZ, 4/11/90.
- ¹²³ ToZ, 6/11/90.
- ¹²⁴ Albert Chali interview, Chingola, 4/2/2003.
- ¹²⁵ 'The Hour' was the MMD's slogan; its use in this context demonstrates the politicised nature of this dispute.
- ¹²⁶ Sefelino Mumba interview.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
- ¹²⁸ MUZ Nchanga/17A, 'CISB correspondence, 1987-91', Nchanga Main MUZ, n.d., list of those dismissed in Nov 1990 strikes; Sefelino Mumba interview.
- ¹²⁹ Sefelino Mumba interview.
- ¹³⁰ MUZ HO, 'MJIC papers, 1985-91', Special MJIC, 26/6/90.
- ¹³¹ MUZ HO, 'MJIC papers, 1985-91', 8th MJIC, 28/11/90.
- ¹³² Interviews: Agnes N'gandwe; Peter Lusaka, Chililabombwe, 18/2/2003; MUZ Nkana, 'Main Executive Committee meetings, 1990-91', Nkana BEC, 15/3/91.
- ¹³³ George Mukoma interview.
- ¹³⁴ ToZ, 24/3/90.
- ¹³⁵ MUZ Nchanga, miscellaneous documents, MUZ Press Release, GS K. Sheng'amo, n.d., following Central Executive Committee meeting, 8/1/91.
- ¹³⁶ MUZ HO, miscellaneous papers, MUZ SC 16/10/90, J. Simakuni, opening remarks.
- ¹³⁷ For example in Ndola: SToZ, 13/1/91.
- ¹³⁸ ToZ, 4/5/91.
- ¹³⁹ SToZ, 5/5/91.
- ¹⁴⁰ Boniface Kumwenda interview.
- ¹⁴¹ Kramer Nyondo interview.
- ¹⁴² Harrison Nkonde interview.
- ¹⁴³ Evelyn Musonda interview.
- ¹⁴⁴ Albert Chali interview.
- ¹⁴⁵ SToZ, 28/4/91.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 27/10/91.
- ¹⁴⁷ Albert Chali interview; see also Peter Lusaka interview.
- ¹⁴⁸ Boniface Kumwenda interview; see also Peter Chileshe interview, Chililabombwe, 12/2/2003.
- ¹⁴⁹ ToZ, 30/10/91.
- ¹⁵⁰ Abel Chisanga interview, Kitwe, 5/11/2002.
- ¹⁵¹ Interviews: Oswell Munyenembe; Raphael Mwanza, Mufulira, 1/3/2003; Kramer Nyondo; Patrick Kanyanta.
- ¹⁵² M. Bratton, 'Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia', in J. Widner (ed), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1994).
- ¹⁵³ George Lombe interview.
- ¹⁵⁴ ToZ, 8/8/91.
- ¹⁵⁵ MUZ HO, 'MJIC papers, 1985-91', MJIC, 5/11/91.
- ¹⁵⁶ ToZ, 5/11/91.
- ¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 5/12/91.
- ¹⁵⁸ MUZ HO, 'MJIC papers, 1985-91', MJIC, 11/10/91.
- ¹⁵⁹ MUZ HO 15/13/81, 'Other Govt Ministries and Govt Bodies, 1981-2001', President Chiluba to General Secretaries of trade unions, n.d. (c. December 1991).
- ¹⁶⁰ M. Larmer, 'Reaction and Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia', Review of African Political Economy No. 103 (March 2005), pp. 29-45.

¹⁶¹ P. Bond, 'Radical Rhetoric and the Working-Class during Zimbabwean Nationalism's Dying Days', in B. Raftopoulos and L. Sachikonye (eds), Striking Back: the Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe (Harare, Weaver Press, 2001).

¹⁶² M. Larmer, 'The Politics of the Stomach': Zimbabwe's Trade Unions and the Movement for Democratic Change in 2002', South African Labour Bulletin, 26, 4 (December 2002), pp. 61-65.

¹⁶³ Larmer, 'Reaction and Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia', passim.

¹⁶⁴ A. Duncan, H. Macmillan, and N. Simutanyi, 'Zambia: Drivers of Pro-Poor Change', (Oxford, Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, 2003).

¹⁶⁵ Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, passim.