

“Competing for the heart and soul of the American Nation: Regional Dynamics and its impact on the ANC’s relationship with the United States of America, 1970-1976

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Work in progress...please do not cite

Prologue

Dear Seminar participants

This paper has been extracted from Chapter III of my Ph.d thesis, which is entitled “*Armed Struggle and diplomacy: The relationship of the ANC towards the USA, 1940-1986*”. At the outset. I need to point out that much of the US research has not been completed for this Chapter. Nevertheless, I have faced many challenges when writing up this piece of work more especially since the period under review was considered by scholars to be a ‘non-event’- juxtaposed on the one side by the Morogoro Conference and on the other, by the 1976 uprising, thus placing a strain on the availability of source material as well as of suitable scholarly analysis of the period. My supervisor Catherine Burns has provided much feedback. However I would like to use the opportunity of this seminar to invite critical, yet positive feedback, which could serve to solve many of the dilemmas that I have confronted when writing up this Chapter. They would emerge as you read through this paper. Also I am seeking your advice on how I should deal with the following predicament:

* How do I bridge the divide that exists between attempting a political as well as a social interpretation of the period. In effect, how does one move successfully from being a political historian to being a social historian. How does one connect the broader social milieu with the political –which I am told requires the fine work of historical imagination.

Scholars writing about the liberation struggle, have, in their analyses, focused extensively on the 1960’s-with events such as the bannings, trials, the development of the early

underground networks dominating their discourses- on and the mid 1970's with the emphasis on the Soweto uprisings and its aftermath. The period in between has been dismissed by scholars such Tom Karis, Gail Gerhart, Scott Thomas and Vladimir Shubin as the 'doldrum period or the period of "flux" to use a few of their descriptions. Many have gone further to write off the ANC as a movement without an agenda, an organization lacking influence especially in the Southern African region or as a submissive participant in the various related debates and processes. However I will argue that contrary to these interpretations and assessments, the ANC was a dynamic movement that responded to events in manner that ensured not only its survival, but also its gradual recognition in the international arena.

Through the many interviews undertaken with ANC exiles as well as through access to official National Executive Committee records, I will illustrate that in spite of the many setbacks in this period, the ANC continued with its institution building and consolidation programmes. By focusing firstly on the problems on the African continent, which was exemplified by the African conferences and resulting decisions and secondly on the official US policies and actions and unofficial US activity, I expect to contend that while many of these events created that cloud of doubt for the ANC's survival, the movement succeeded in emerging from the 'doldrums' relatively unscathed, so much so that by 1976, the OAU was on their side, while Pretoria was on retreat.

While it will not be possible, for the purposes of this presentation, to focus, with any degree of detail on the networking activities and the behind the scene discussions, I will nevertheless concentrate on events and activities only in Africa and in the USA that gave rise to these political debates, personal discussions and international networking activities. The adoption of this method has been guided by my view that it was these very events that created the particular mood of the period and it is vital for participants to get a sense of the mood that prevailed from 1970-1975. I will also undertake an assessment of the politics and dramas behind the *Lusaka Manifesto* and the *National Security Study Memorandum(NSSM)* –two documents produced in this period and which, at a first glance, appear to have exercised a regressive effect on the movement's attempts

to advance the struggle internationally. ¹ The relationship of the ANC with the Soviet Union and the many networking activities between these two countries will not be examined in this presentation, but has been covered extensively in the Chapter.

On the African continent, this was a time of many regional shifts, which had arisen as a result of many foreseen and unforeseen events. Having said that, it becomes vital to begin my study by exploring the reasons for such developments. It was the apartheid state that acted as the key protagonist in the region when John Vorster embarked on a new ‘outward policy’ towards African states². This radical departure in foreign policy was to pose a serious challenge to the ANC and other liberation movements in the region. It was to test the strength of ANC-OAU relations. More importantly, it was to create a mood of horror within the ANC camps. From the many discussions held with the major players of the period, meetings and frantic discussions behind the scenes intensified to assess the importance of developing a strategy to counter Pretoria’s strategies.³

Publicly, the ANC’s Director of Political Affairs, Duma Nokwe, reacted to this alarming development, by comparing Vorster’s new policy to “a spider’s web carefully and systematically spun to ensnare weak African governments like flies, into the influence and control of the racists and imperialists”⁴. The first African leader to respond to Vorster’s new initiatives was Chief Leboa Jonathan from Lesotho, who visited South Africa in 1967. As expected, the ANC’s response to this visit was one of disappointment and contempt, accusing Lesotho of humiliating the African continent by going “cap in hand to beg for crumbs from the aggressor’s table”⁵. In May of the same year, Malawi’s President Hastings Banda visited South Africa and a day before the OAU summit began in Kinshasa, diplomatic relations between these two countries were established. In fact relations between South Africa and Malawi began in 1966, when a secret loan was granted for different projects⁶. Nokwe again sent out a futile and ineffective warning to others planning to follow in Banda’s footsteps:

Those who are going to frogmarch to Pretoria following Banda to wine and dine with the racists, can only be warned that ‘he who sups with the devil must use a long spoon’⁷

Unfortunately for the ANC, the OAU was slow to respond to the Malawi and Lesotho actions. This was attributed to the Summit’s concern with the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war and with the problems of the Liberation Committee, rather than with the breach of South Africa’s isolation⁸. However at the fifth summit conference of the Eastern and Central African states in Lusaka in April 1969, the impact of Vorster’s foreign policy was acknowledged and challenged by thirteen countries. This conference was extremely important because it showcased the shortcomings of ANC influence on African diplomacy.

The strategy document produced by the conference was entitled “*Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa*”. What was important about this document was that although it differed from ANC goals, it was still adopted as an official OAU policy. The ANC had three main objections against this document. Firstly, as the movement was involved in renewed attempts at armed struggle, such as the Wankie Campaign, the Manifesto made reference to the importance of “peaceful change”. Secondly, the document undermined the ANC view that the apartheid state was an illegitimate one. Thirdly, the Lusaka Manifesto separated the struggles of South Africa from those of Rhodesia and Namibia⁹. Although the latter objection went against ANC military and diplomatic strategy, this policy was endorsed by the frontline states and the OAU. The signatories of this manifesto endorsed the aim of a liberated Southern Africa. But, much to the horror of the ANC, they went further to suggest their willingness to establish relations with colonial and racist governments. Liberation movements were encouraged to ‘desist from armed struggle’ if those governments provided their acceptance of the ‘principle of human equality’¹⁰. The *African Communist* described the Lusaka Manifesto as “insufferably patronizing and even arrogant”¹¹.

Even at the Addis Ababa summit in September 1970, the conference appeared reluctant to endorse any firm action towards South Africa, Instead, it endorsed the Lusaka

Manifesto, thus alarming the ANC even more. Even in regards to the issue of arms sales to South Africa by NATO countries, there was no consensus on the matter of condemning these arm sales.

From interviews undertaken with ANC cadres, it was evident that the movement felt strongly about Lusaka Manifesto. In fact, many in the movement felt betrayed by the document¹². Yet, as indicated earlier on, while Vorsters initiatives resulted in much public scurrying and protestations by the ANC, the *Manifesto* as well as the African responses did not evoke any such reactions. In public, the ANC remained accepting of the terms. Even Sechaba, which regularly reported on African conferences, remained quiet on the Lusaka meeting¹³. In trying to analyse this perception, an anonymous source alluded to the many serious political debates that transpired in Tanzania over this issue. But the decision was taken to keep these debates confidential, and to desist from make any public pronouncements for fear of drawing the attention of the apartheid state to the blatant betrayal of the African states.¹⁴

However when the Seventh Summit conference of East and Central African States met in Mogadishu in October 1971, they adopted a harsh stance towards those countries that took advantage of the Vorster's new initiatives in foreign policy. Perhaps the greatest significance of this meeting was its granting of observer status, for all future meetings, to liberation movements such as the ANC and PAC. Given the nature of the terms of the Lusaka Manifesto, it would appear that the resolutions adopted at Mogadishu provided the ANC with a certain degree of optimism in its attempts to secure the support of the region. This positive mood could be contrasted with the somber moods generated by the adoption of the *Lusaka Manifesto*. Secretary-General Alfred Nzo described the declaration as a 'revolutionary document', expecting it to lead to more support, in different forms, for the liberation movements.¹⁵

While this situation unfolded, the twenty-fourth session of the African Liberation Committee took place in Dar es Salaam in January 1975. A highlight of the meeting was the production of a major policy document entitled 'The African Strategy in Southern Africa'. Scott Thomas has argued that there were many similarities between this

document and the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’¹⁶. Like the manifesto, the strategy encapsulated in this document, separated the Rhodesian and Namibian struggles from the South African struggle. Much to the dismay of the ANC, it went further to prioritise those struggles. The Front Line states such as Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, supported this document and even the OAU later provided its endorsement¹⁷.

It was apparent to the ANC that a reassessment of its strategy was necessary. For this purpose and in preparation for the OAU’s ministerial session to be held in April, a meeting of the ANC’s Revolutionary Council and the National Executive took place in March 1975 in Morogoro. A study of Tambo’s Presidential address to the meeting, makes some interesting revelations. In his address, a very demoralised Tambo lamented the poor performance of the ANC. He made reference to the ANC’s past failures and made a candid reference to the organisation’s poor management. His perception that the movement was perhaps still “ill managed, poorly directed and badly led”, was not really far off the mark¹⁸. While the mood was no different from the Morogoro Conference of 1969, this meeting, I would argue, was an important gathering aimed at plotting the future course of the movement.

In response to the new developments in the Southern African region, Tambo emphasised that:

Much has happened in Africa to require of us to re-state the objectives of our struggle. In this connection, the forthcoming OAU meeting is not about ‘détente’. It is a meeting about the goals and future of our struggle...It is a meeting about the future of Africa”¹⁹.

It was the ANC view that since the Portuguese coup had altered the balance of power in Africa, the USA, together with other Western powers and South Africa and its allies, had adopted a ‘counter-revolutionary offensive’. To neutralise South Africa’s diplomatic initiatives in Africa, a dual pronged approach was needed. Action was needed from international organisations such as the UN and OAU and through the solidarity of the

international anti-apartheid network²⁰. Again, the ANC saw its salvation in the international realm.

When the ministerial session began in Dar Es Salaam in April 1975, the ANC delegation was led by Oliver Tambo and included Josiah Jele, who was the Head of the Department of International Affairs, Johnny Makatini, the ANC Chief Representative from Algeria, Florence Moposho, from the Woman's department, Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General and Moses Mabhida, a member of the National Executive. The meeting was opened by Julius Nyerere who made a strong plea for South Africa's isolation, pointing out that the meeting was "not about so-called dialogue or detent with South Africa", but about "the liberation of Southern Africa"²¹. While the ANC appeared to be placated by this declaration which focused on the movement's main foreign policy objective of isolating South Africa, it failed to exercise influence on the OAU in other areas. There were three such areas. The first related to the priority accorded to the Namibian and Rhodesian struggles; the second related to the talks between Vorster and Front Line States which the ANC perceived as a blatant 'betrayal of African interests'; the third related to the ANC's dissatisfaction with paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto, which made reference to South Africa as a sovereign State. In spite of these concerns and arguments put forward, the ANC failed to influence the OAU which again gave its support to the Liberation Committee's Dar es Salam Declaration which prioritised the struggle of Namibia and Rhodesia.

Again it was the Rhodesian struggle that dominated events in the region after this meeting. In August 1975, the talks between Ian Smith and the liberation movements collapsed. This led to a meeting of the Frontline States in Quelimane, Mozambique in February of the next year, during which they acknowledged the failure of attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian dilemma. In view of the recognition of the need for a far more effective strategic initiative, it was unanimously agreed to support armed struggle.

The meeting, while not recognized by historians as vital, had enormous international repercussions, especially in the US, where it was widely believed that if there was any

escalation in the conflict, the role of the Soviet Union would be amplified. It was vital for the United States to intervene in ensuring that a peaceful settlement was implemented.

These changes in the Southern African region had far reaching implications for American foreign policy. In fact, Thomas has argued that these changes in the region, which followed the Portuguese coup as well as the Soviet and Cuban involvements in Angola and Cuba, led to a “complete reorientation of American foreign policy in the region”²². It was not surprising then for the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to begin his African tour in April 1976. After meeting with Nyerere in Dar es Salaam and with Kaunda in Lusaka, he announced his country’s full support for majority rule

Adopting a rather despondent view of the ANC’s position in Africa, Vladimir Shubin described the African continent as being “in a state of flux”, prophesizing further doom for the ANC and its attempts to establish itself internationally as well as to isolate South Africa²³. Such pessimism may have been justified for while the ANC was trying desperately to establish foreign relations with, and seek the support and attention of the countries like the USA, it was experiencing no success even on the African continent. The effects of South African initiatives such as ‘dialogue’ were tragic for the liberation movements as relations between African countries and the apartheid state continued to grow. Even countries such as Tanzania and Zambia began to feel marginalized by these shifts in policy.

This also probably explains the reasons why MK lost its capacity to operate from Zamibia and Tanzania. In Zambia, where the ANC headquarters were located, President Kenneth Kaunda alluded to the “voice of reason for which Africa and the whole world were waiting”²⁴. However, the reality was that this African country began to feel the pressure exerted by Pretoria. Several attacks were made on Zambia by agents of the apartheid state. These included the parcel bomb explosion which killed the ANC Deputy Chief Representative, Adolfus Mvemve (John Dube). Many other activists, including Max Sisulu, were wounded and received treatment in a Moscow Hospital.²⁵. Two issues were apparent- the future of the ANC in Zambia was unpredictable and the relationship between these them was strained. In 1974, the ANC was instructed by the Zambian

authorities not to undertake any attacks against South Africa from Zambian soil. In fact, the instruction went beyond this to request the ANC to cut back on its struggle-related activities. At its Morogoro Executive Meeting, it protested that:

The fascists enemy, under the smokescreen of...peaceful solution talks.. 'development', 'co-operation', 'financial aid' and 'détente' to mention a few of its newly found slogans, is feverishly and rapidly strengthening its defences of the status quo in our country, recruiting allies from among our own anti-imperialist ranks and moving out in a determined bid to break up or sow confusion in the international solidarity movement²⁶.

This could even explain the sudden decision to close the ANC camps in Tanzania, where some members of that country's leadership treated with suspicion the presence of non-Africans and communists within the ANC. This latter behaviour could also be attributed to influence of China over Tanzania at this time.

Through the preceding study of the developments on the African continent, together with the analysis of the effects Pretoria's new policies and of the *Lusaka Manifesto*, I have demonstrated the importance, for the ANC, of the need for developing an international relationship, such as that with the USA. In any event, the movement had already seen the writing clearly on the wall. And on the basis of the evidence presented, it was apparent that the movement did persevere in this direction, in spite of the many obstacles in its path.

But the situation in the Western world, including the United Nations, was no better. Although the US government continued to appear critical of apartheid, together with other countries like Britain, France and West Germany, it remained highly resistant towards measures such as the proposal for economic sanctions against the apartheid state. There had been no consistent condemnation by the US of apartheid policies, nor has there been any evidence of an inclination to support strong action against South Africa or of building strong links with the liberation movements such as the ANC.

In fact, not long after Sharpsville, Western nations such as the US worked to strengthen the Pretoria regime. During the Nixon administration, evidence has indicated a sharp move to the right in relation to US policy towards South Africa. This evidence was provided in the form of the *National Security Study Memorandum* or *NSSM 39*. In 1969, this document was drafted under the direction of the US President's National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, as a means to providing the administration with policy options for Southern Africa.²⁷ In essence then *NSSM 39*, which represented a secret study, was intended to assist the National Security Council with guidelines for a US policy framework for southern Africa. Hence any study of US policy towards South Africa would not be complete without an analysis of this document. In terms of this document, there were five elemental goals of US policy. They were:

- To improve the US standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.
- To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the \area and the risk of US involvement.
- To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements.
- To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.
- To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production²⁸.

Perhaps of greater significance was the line that followed these objectives. "These objectives are to a degree contradictory---pursuit of one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the others²⁹. At no point in the study has there been any consideration given to how to resolve this dilemma of the contradiction. According to Roger Morris, who was one of the main authors of the study, it was intriguing to note

how 'clientism' and not objectivity, determined the positions that were adopted by the different agencies

There was no doubt that the behaviour of officials in the Nixon administration was driven by personal and organizational interests as well as by personal and organizational prejudices. Individual perceptions of Africa and African issues were also determining factors in policy making initiatives. Whenever African issues emerged as areas of discussion, Alexander Haig gestured wildly as though he was beating drums on the table³⁰. The President himself, could not understand African tribes could be more intelligent and accomplished than others, referring to African people as "jigs"³¹. Other officials were unable to distinguish between Rhodesia and South Africa.

For scholars such as Bernard Magubane, the significance of this document lay in its intention to "formalise the pro-apartheid United States foreign policy" and was a recognition of the "impending crisis facing the white regimes"³². He has also alluded to the attitudes of Southern Senators like Strom Thurmond, who remained hostile towards liberal foreign policy initiatives of the Kennedy and Johnson administration and were thus supportive of the rightward swing in the Nixon Southern Africa policy

In effect, the significance of *NSSM 39* lay in its ability to provide us with that window into US policy goals and what guided the US onto a course that led to greater international intervention. In view of these directions, it was not surprising that when in 1971, Portugal faced its crisis of empire, President Nixon intervened swiftly. The rationale for this intervention was that the US required not only a powerful NATO, but also access to Portugal's strategic base in the Azores. In return for such access, Nixon signed an executive agreement that made available to that country, a loan of \$436 million which assisted Portugal with covering the costs of its colonial wars in Africa.³³

The friendly ties that existed between the Nixon administration and the apartheid state were reinforced in 1973 when Henry Kissinger assumed the position of Secretary of State. Danaher pointed out that as Secretary of State, only one African ambassador was allowed access to him-Johan Botha of South Africa. Even the head of the South African

intelligence agency, Hendrik van der Bergh visited Washington often and maintained close ties with George Bush who was Head of the CIA at the time³⁴.

Writing in the *New York Times*, a Mr. Terence Smith alerted readers to a secret debate within the Nixon administration, where the Defence Department indicated the need to treat the apartheid state as any sovereign friendly nation, without any regard for her internal policies. But the National Security Council favoured a partial relationship towards South Africa combined with milder language at the UN and elsewhere. As seen from the *NSSM*, the latter course was already agreed upon. Mr. Smith went on to report that Nixon and his advisors reached agreement that since the USA was involved in Indo-China and elsewhere, it could not take on the problem of Southern Africa.³⁵

The ANC perception of the situation was that, through such understandings and agreements, the US expected the “the liberation movements to disappear for want of international support and assistance” and that vital states such as Tanzania and Zambia would “lose interest and become inward looking...and reach accommodations with the apartheid states”³⁶. Their interpretation of this inter-connected set of approaches and policies- which involved opposition to the liberation movements, peaceful change, “withdrawing Africa from the strategic battleground of the cold war” and conditional economic aid-was that is represented a means of “safeguarding southern Africa as a critical base area for international imperialism in the African continent”³⁷. Little wonder then that the Vorster and Smith regimes welcomed the Nixon initiatives and Rogers pronouncements as “realistic” and “refreshing”³⁸.

The African National Congress faced the daunting realization that any attempt to establish a relationship with, and seek assistance from the US, was grim. All evidence pointed to the commitment of the Nixon administration to assisting the South African state to entrench its powers and privileges. In its analysis of the Nixon policy, the *New York Times* declared that the effect of such policy would be:

To help South Africa and Rhodesia and to give sanction to the pentagon to proceed with their reported plans to treat the stability of

Southern Africa as a strategic interest of the United States which in effect will call for more explicit collaboration with the Southern African regime in the military and political fields³⁹.

At the same time, and during this period, several government departments such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce and the Export-Import Bank, continued to pave the way for improved business relations between the United States and South Africa. In any event, the corporate environment in South Africa, appeared so attractive to US business that they needed no encouragement from their government to invest in the apartheid state⁴⁰. “The Star” made a made very important observation. It reported that while American companies were under greater pressure to withdraw their investments from South Africa, there was very little information available on the ‘scope and size’ of these investments. The report admitted that there was reason to believe that they represented only the tip of the iceberg⁴¹

In spite of the existence of such a hostile climate in the US and other Western nations, the ANC was determined to keep the pressure going. The movement clearly had no illusions about the defeat of the apartheid state. It emphasized that such a state could only be defeated inside the country by the actions of armed Black South Africans. But just as important was the need for the sharpening of its skills in the development of foreign relations especially with the US. This was an important pre-requisite in the development of a well focused international solidarity movement⁴².

Karis and Gerhart have argued that opposition to US investment by anti-apartheid activists and African Americans had little effect on official state policy at this time⁴³. It was only towards the end of the decade that African American leaders began to exert any significant influence on their country’s policies. While this argument holds true up to a point, I would contend that evidence existed of effective anti-apartheid activity in the 70’s. The scenario was not as gloomy as Karis and Gerhart have concluded. By the early 1970’s, the infrastructure was already in place for anti-apartheid activity in the US. Since 1912 the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured people (NAACP) played a role in the organizing of the African National Congress. The Council on African

Affairs was a black led, extremist organization, concerned with the liberation of Africans in the early years. In 1953, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), emerged out of efforts to support the South African pass law agitators. The success of these movements also depended on their reaction to South African events and on their abilities to draw more supporters for their work⁴⁴. In May 1972, 20 000 black people marched in Washington to express solidarity with South African liberation movements.

In the same year, in a message sent to Sechaba, African –American leader and representative to the World Peace Council Commission on the struggle against racism in the USA, Mr, Claude Lightfoot admitted that while there was not much understanding in the past, on the part of African-Americans, of the liberation struggle, by 1972, there was a more focused interest in the South African struggle. He attributed this interests and understanding to, among others, the work of the Congressional Black Caucus. In 1972, the Caucus held a conference in Washington-which was the result of the Black political Convention held at Gary, Indiana-where an overwhelming majority of African Americans was represented. Lightfoot assured the ANC that “the struggle waged by our black brothers and sisters in the Southern part of the African continent is directly connected with the mainstream of the battle of the Afro-American people for liberation”⁴⁵.

Churches in the US also became involved in anti-apartheid activity. In 1966, Protestant denominations withdrew about \$23 million in deposits from 10 banks, including Citibank. This was done in protest at American banks enthusiasm to make loans available to South Africa. It was also the churches who were responsible for discovering the existence of the “Frankfurt Documents”⁴⁶. Even state and local governments were targeted by anti-apartheid activities in the early 1970’s, but it was only in the 1980,s that they were successful in pressurizing these institutions to withdraw funds from businesses operating in South Africa. But in cases such as those of Washington DC, and Gary, Indiana, their actions were significant. Janet Love has identified these councils as being the first to adopt anti-apartheid resolutions, advising that city services and supplies not be purchased from specific companies doing business with South Africa⁴⁷. This action was followed by the cities of Madison (1976), Berkeley (1979), Davis (1978). By the early 1980’s, of the 27 local councils ‘entertaining’ anti-apartheid policies, 22 passed one or

more pieces of anti-apartheid legislation⁴⁸. In 1971 The Polaroid Revolutionary worker's Union (P.R.W.M) embarked on a struggle to pressure the Polaroid Corporation to end all trade with South Africa.

Not long after, General Motors came under attack from anti-apartheid lobbyists and Automobile Union officials. In February the Rand Daily Mail reported on the visit to South Africa of a Senior GM executive to work out a "Polaroid type" deal to respond to calls that it should cease business activities with the apartheid state⁴⁹.

While the UN general Assembly remained sympathetic to the liberation movements' cause, in the Security Council this was not possible. As major Western nations such as the US, Britain and France enjoyed the powers of veto, it was difficult to expect any significant action from this quarter against South Africa. But on its own, in 1973, the General Assembly denounced apartheid as a "crime against humanity", and in so doing, prevented South Africa from participating in plenary sessions since 1974.⁵⁰ However, Janet Love has cautioned against being too critical of the UN. She has pointed out that this body has been an important source of funds and other aid for guerilla movements in Southern Africa. Reference has been made to the different programmes established in the 1960's as a result of pressure from African and Asian governments. These included the Trust Fund for South Africa, the Educational Programme for Southern Africa and the Fund for Namibia. It has been found that from 1965-1980, the Trust Fund for Southern Africa distributed 95 grants with a value of \$10.47 million.

Also, in 1974 the United Nations passed Resolution 3411 G (xxx), recognizing "the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the South African people"⁵¹. Clearly, such official recognition represented a political and diplomatic breakthrough for an organisation determined to succeed in drawing the attention of the international arena to its dilemmas. But, in analysing the significance of this resolution for the ANC, William Steyn has clarified that this recognition did not mean official government recognition by member states. Also, by making specific reference to "liberation movements, it demonstrated acceptance of the ANC as with other South African liberation movements such as the PAC. The UN was careful not to recognize the ANC as

the only liberation movement representing the political aspirations of South African blacks. In effect then the ANC was in a different and weaker position than the SWAPO⁵². But Steyn has provided evidence to indicate that the status accorded to the ANC was very high. The fact that it was given observer status in the General Assembly and Security Council, implied that that it was provided not only with a favourable chance to participate in discussions on South Africa, but also with the opportunity to play an active role in resolutions passed by the United Nations on the apartheid state.

Even on the African continent, the picture was not all that bleak as made out by historians.. For the ANC, the Portuguese coup in April 1974, brought much hope. With the coup, came independence to Guinea Bisseau in September 1974, to Mozambique in June 1975 and to Angola in November 1975. It was clear that the balance of power in the region, was undergoing a significant modification, much to the consternation of the South African State which perceived further threats to its security. The fact that one of South Africa's neighbours was administered by a liberation movement was very heartening for the ANC. This perception was reinforced on 25 June 1975, during the independence ceremony, when support for the ANC was expressed by Samora Machel and Frelimo. The ANC delegation to this ceremony, which was led by Oliver Tambo, was warmly welcomed by thousands of Mozambicans⁵³. Machel introduced Tambo as his "friend, comrade and brother in arms"

Relations with other countries in the Southern African region began to improve. This was evident in Lesotho and Swaziland-although the establishment of such relationships was not without many problems⁵⁴.

From the 1960's the ANC enjoyed a cordial relationship with the MPLA and this relationship endured for many years. On 4 February 1975, an ANC delegation was sent to Luanda to commemorate the anniversary of armed struggle and to celebrate the triumphant return to the capital of Agostino Neto. On 4 February 1976, an International Solidarity Conference was held in Luanda. The ANC had played a crucial role in the organization of this conference as well as in the international campaign to secure support for the MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola. The ANC delegation to the

conference was headed by Johnny Makatini. This relationship with Angola had severe repercussions for the ANC's relationship with Zambia, who, at that time, supported UNITA. As pointed out by Shubin, this was a peculiar situation-to have the ANC headquarters in a country which sided with the ANC's enemy. As alluded to earlier in my discussion, the relationship between Zambia and the ANC had been strained due to the pressures exerted by the apartheid state on the former.

As the Angolan Government viewed the ANC as a faithful friend of the struggle as well as against future South African aggression, it conveyed its willingness to host an ANC office and to assist in the training of MK cadres. As a result of such agreements, an ANC training camp was developed in the country. By February 1976, it had become evident to the movement that Angola could become a dependable base. With this realization came the decision to train all MK fighters in Angola and that only specialized training would be undertaken in Russia as well as other friendly countries⁵⁵.

While developments on the African continent and the politics of the *Lusaka Manifesto* and the *National Security Study Memorandum or NSSM 39* may have outwardly sounded the death knell for the liberation struggle waged by the African National Congress, and for its attempts to gain recognition from the USA, evidence provided has proved the contrary- thus dispelling the traditional hypothesis of scholars. With the Portuguese coup of 1974, the activity of the anti-apartheid movements, and the work of the UN, even though of a limited nature, the ANC was able, during the period under review, to successfully manoeuvre its ways through these obstacles and gain some recognition in the US and in the African region. Though not significant, the competition for the heart and soul of the American people was beginning to yield some results. However a catalyst was needed to fully catapult the African National Congress into the international arena. That catalyst was provided by the Soweto uprising of 1976.

ENDNOTES

1. I will undertake a limited assessment of these documents in this seminar.
2. It was expected that this policy would help normalize South Africa's relations with African countries.
3. Official interviews were undertaken with Joe Matthews, Phyllis Jordan, Ahmed Kathrada , Kay Moonsamy and Phyllis Naidoo. Informal discussions were held with many of the cadres based at Morogoro.
4. Sechaba, Vol. 5. No. 6, June 1971.
5. Quoted in the ANC's Weekly news digest, *Spotlight on South Africa*, 17 February, 1967, p. 2.
6. Barrett, John., "South African Diplomacy at the UN", in Barridge, G. R., and Jennings, A. (eds.), Diplomacy at the UN (London, Macmillan Press, 1985), p. 144.
7. Sechaba, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1971.
8. This was one of the organs of the OAU which was concerned with African Liberation policy. It was through this organ that Liberation Movements were able to exercise direct influence on OAU decision making. The committee included foreign ministers of OAU member states and other member states that wanted to attend its meetings.
9. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, (London, Faber and Faber, 1981), p. 134.
10. The African Communist, No. 40, 1969, p. 8.
11. Ibid.
12. Zwide interviews undertaken in April 2002.
13. This conclusion is based on my scrutiny of all editions of Sechaba published just after the Lusaka meeting.
14. Interviewee requested condition of anonymity.
15. Scott Thomas, The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress since 1960 (Taurus, London), p. 134.
16. Ibid., p. 135.

17. This was a loose grouping of African states that got together to ensure regional security, in response to Vorster's initiatives of 'détente' in 1974. It initially included the independent states in Southern Africa such as Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. After the collapse of 'detent', they became a vital negotiating force.
18. Sechaba, May 1975.
19. Ibid.
20. This was part of the declaration of the National Executive Committee, in Minutes of NEC, 1975, in Sechaba, May 1975.
21. Sechaba, Special Issue, June/July 1975.
22. Scott, 'Foreign Relations of the ANC', p. 140.
23. Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Mayibue, Western Cape, 1999), p. 98.
24. Sechaba, No. 5. 1975.
25. Max Sisulu was Walter Sisulu's son. He received treatment at the Burdenko Military Hospital in Moscow.
26. Unity in Action: A short history of the African National Congress(South Africa) 1912-1982 (Caledonian Press, London), p. 57-60
27. Bernard Magubane, "SA-USA Relations"(unpublished paper), p.11.
28. Kevin Danaher, The Political Economy of US Policy towards South Africa (Westview Press, London), p. 91.
29. Ibid.
30. Alexander Haig was the National Security Council aide to President Nixon.
31. Danaher, Political Economy, p. 93.
32. Magubane, "SA-USA", p. 11.
33. Ibid., p. 8.
34. Danaher, Political Economy, p. 97.
35. *New York times*, 2 April 1972.
36. This was based on the ANC's analysis of the US Secretary of States, William Roger's African Tour and on Nixon's foreign policy speech, in Sechaba, May 1970.

37. **Ibid.**
38. **As announced by the South African Foreign Minister.**
39. ***New York Times***
40. **Janet Love, The US Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics (Praeger, New York, 1985), p. 14.**
41. ***The Star*, 27 May 1972.**
42. **Editorial, Sechaba, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1971.**
43. **Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, Vol. 5, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979 (UNISA Press, Pretoria, 1997), p. 9.**
According to these authors, African-Americans comprised only 12% of the population.
44. **Love, US Anti-Apartheid Movement, p. 16.**
45. **Sechaba, Vol. 6, No. 8, 8 August 1972.**
46. **These documents contained information on the secret agreements that American banks made with South Africa regarding the issue of loans through the European-American Banking Corporation.**
47. **By 1975, there were 43 such councils who adopted anti-apartheid legislation.**
48. **Love, US Anti Apartheid Movement, p. 43.**
49. **Sechaba, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1971.**
50. **Love, Anti-Apartheid Movement, p. 4**
51. **W. P. Esterhuyse, "The International Political Status of the African National Congress", in Africa Insight, Vol, 19, No. 1, 1989, p. 31.**
52. **In relation to SWAPO, the UN recognized this movement as the sole liberation movement of Namibia. This view placed the ANC in a somewhat weaker position than the Namibian liberation movement.**
53. **The delegation also included Joe Modise and other NEC members.**
54. **The ANC set up its underground machinery in Lesotho. But by 1975, the Lesotho security services harassed the movement. Chris Hani and his assistants were detained and brutalized by the security apparatus as they began to set up the underground structures. Authorities in that country**

were suspicious of money provided to Hani for the setting up of this structure. They believed that the finances made available were to be used by the opposition Basutoland Congress Party. In Swaziland, the ANC experienced similar problems. While the king supported the work of the movement, officials in his government remained suspicious of the ANC. As a result of this, the ANC experienced difficulties such as the detention of Thabo Mbeki.

55. Shubin makes this claim on the basis of his discussions held with Thomas Nkobi and Alfred Nzo in Moscow on 3 February 1976.