“Anticolonial Nationalism in French West Africa: What Made Guinea Unique?”

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Abstract:
In a 1958 constitutional referendum, Guinea was the only French territory to reject continued subordination in favor of immediate independence. Why did Guinea alone reject the constitutional project? What factors stimulated political parties in other French territories to accept continued tutelage, even as activists elsewhere on the continent were agitating for independence? Focusing on the eight territories of French West Africa, I argue that the Guinean branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, which led the campaign for the “no” vote, differed from other dominant parties in French West Africa in four important ways. It was these differences that resulted in Guinea’s unique stance in the 1958 referendum.

Introduction:
The year 1960 was pivotal for African nationalist movements. In February, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned a South African audience that “the wind of change” was blowing across the African continent and that the tide of African nationalism could not be stopped.1 By the year’s end, the Belgian Congo, Nigeria, and British and Italian Somaliland had witnessed the end of colonial rule. The French African empire disintegrated as the United Nations trusts of Togo and Cameroon, the island of Madagascar, the four territories of former French Equatorial Africa, and seven of eight former French West Africa territories claimed their independence.2 Guinea, the eighth territory, had struck out alone two years earlier. In an empire-wide constitutional referendum in September 1958, Guinea had been the only French territory to reject continued French tutelage in favor of immediate independence. Few would have predicted that two years later, much of the continent would follow in its wake.
Although Guinea’s negative response to the 1958 proposition has been recognized as unique, there has been little attempt to explain the phenomenon comparatively. Why did Guinea alone reject the constitutional project that would have relegated it to junior partnership in a French-dominated community? What factors stimulated political parties in other territories to accept continued subordination, with no end in sight, despite the wave of nationalist fervor that was gripping the continent? While classic works on French West Africa provide an enormous amount of information on ethnic alliances and cleavages, party leadership and structures and, to some extent, political mobilization during the postwar period, they do not use this material to draw conclusions about the 1958 referendum. My earlier work has analyzed the Guinean nationalist movement and its vote for independence in terms of its successful ethnic, class, and gender alliances and the victory of progressive over conservative forces. However, it has made only brief comparisons with other French West African cases. Today, fifty years after Guinea embraced independence and embarked upon a bold, if ultimately flawed, nation-building project, we have yet to understand the factors that contributed to Guinea’s unique position and the implications of these findings for other political movements, both historically and in contemporary society.

Focusing on the eight territories of French West Africa (Guinea, French Soudan, Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Mauritania), I argue that a number of factors rendered Guinea’s post-World War II political movement unique. The Guinean branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), which led the nation to independence, differed from other dominant parties in French West Africa in four important ways. It was distinctive in terms of, first, the class base of its leadership; second, the effectiveness of its grassroots ethnic,
class, gender, and regional alliances; third, the strength of its organization at the local level; and fourth, the degree of popular participation in party decisions. A final critical variable was the power of the colonial chieftaincy in the territories under investigation. While parties in other territories generally were dominated by political, economic, and religious elites who had a stake in the colonial system, the Guinean RDA was led by low-level civil servants and trade unionists who were frustrated by the strictures of colonial rule. In many French West African territories, postwar political parties were based on or fractured along ethnic and regional lines. In Guinea, the RDA built a successful, if fragile, national alliance that embraced men and women of all ethnicities, classes, and regions. Parties in most of the territories were dominated by powerful leaders in the urban areas and had few mechanisms for grassroots participation. The Guinean RDA, in contrast, was relatively democratic in both structure and practice. Throughout the 1950s, pressure from the grassroots pushed the party to an increasingly radical stance. Finally, Guinea’s African-run local government, established under the *loi-cadre* reforms of 1956, abolished the institution of the canton chieftaincy in December 1957. In every other territory, government-appointed chiefs, who collected taxes and enforced colonial policies at the local level, continued to wield immense power, which they used to oppose independence in 1958.

**The Class Base of Party Leadership in French West Africa**

In the decades following World War II, European empires in African and Asia were threatened by widespread anticolonial protests. Having suffered from military conscription, forced labor, and mandatory crop production during the war, and having imbibed Allied rhetoric that the struggle was for freedom and democracy, colonial subjects demanded political and economic reforms as compensation for their wartime sacrifices. It was in this context that the RDA was
established in Bamako, French Soudan in October 1946. An interterritorial political alliance with affiliates in most of the French West and Equatorial African territories and the United Nations trusts of Togo and Cameroon, the RDA shared a number of objectives with the contemporaneous movement for pan-Arab unity that was gaining strength in North Africa and the Middle East. Its goals included greater political autonomy for the colonized territories, unity across territorial boundaries, and equality of political, economic, and social rights for colonial and metropolitan peoples. During the first postwar decade, it dominated the political scene in much of French West Africa.⁹ At the time of the September 1958 constitutional referendum, the RDA’s primary rival in French West Africa was the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA). Organized in March 1958, the PRA brought together most of the African political parties that were not affiliated with the RDA.¹⁰

The territorial branches of the two principal parties had much in common. In every territory but Guinea and French Soudan, the dominant parties were led by wealthy traders, planters, chiefs, and religious leaders, although their conservative tendencies were sometimes mitigated by the more radical views of Western-educated elites.¹¹ In Guinea, French Soudan, and Niger, radical trade unionists were among the parties’ key leaders. In Niger, however, the trade unionists’ progressive influence was neutralized by that of conservative chiefs, who worked with the colonial administration to defeat the constitutional project.¹²

The class background of Guinean political leaders explains much about their attitudes and allegiances. In contrast to Senegal and the Ivory Coast, in Guinea African planters were few in number and insignificant as a political force. Conservative religious leaders and government-appointed chiefs almost universally opposed the RDA and formed the backbone of rival
The Guinean RDA was led by low-level civil servants and trade unionists, who generally were the product of primary and technical schools in Guinea, as well as radical young teachers, who had received more advanced education in other territories and were often members of the independent African teachers’ union. Most of Guinea’s trade unions were affiliated with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which in turn was linked to the Parti Communiste Français (PCF). While the CGT unions included Western-educated civil servants, they were dominated numerically by non-literate workers such as domestic servants, dock workers, and orderlies, who formed the base of the RDA’s political organization. For the better part of the 1950s, both the Guinean RDA and CGT were led by Sékou Touré, one of the most influential trade unionists in French West Africa.

Civil servants at the bottom of the civil service hierarchy often joined the RDA out of frustration. Stymied by their lack of advanced diplomas, these low-level functionaries were unable to rise to the highest ranks of their profession and chafed at the limitations imposed upon them. In contrast, the top echelons of the civil service, staffed by graduates of the prestigious William Ponty federal school in Senegal and its counterparts in other territories, tended to be hostile to the RDA. The most privileged of the “modernizing” elites, Ponty alumni generally joined officially-sanctioned parties and were dismissed as “valets of the administration” by RDA members. Although Ponty-educated teachers had much in common with other Ponty alumni, they broke over the issue of the RDA—creating a schism among Guinea’s most educated intellectuals. A number of sources indicate that the majority of teachers—perhaps as many as 90 percent—were RDA members.
Most similar to the Guinean RDA in terms of party leadership were the Union Soudanaise, the RDA affiliate in French Soudan, and Sawaba, the PRA affiliate in Niger. Like the Guinean RDA, Union Soudanaise was led by low-level civil servants and trade unionists, including a large body of teachers. Its secretary-general was Modibo Kéïta, a Ponty-educated teacher. Sawaba, previously known as the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA), also had a strong trade union base and counted teachers and other civil servants among its leaders. However, the radical influence of these forces were counterbalanced by that of powerful, pro-government chiefs. Severely weakened by internal divisions, the party was an unlikely alliance formed from the remnants of the radical RDA affiliate, Union Démocratique Nigérienne (UDN), which had been expelled from the RDA in 1955 for refusing to sanction its break with the PCF, and the Bloc Nigérien d’Action (BNA), a party of conservative chiefs. In the March 1957 territorial elections, which led to the establishment of an African-run local government, the chiefs were decisive in ensuring the party’s victory. In the election’s aftermath, Western-educated civil servants, radical trade unionists, and chiefs joined together in an uneasy coalition government led by Bakary Djibo, a former CGT trade union leader. The alliance would disintegrate before the 1958 constitutional referendum.

In contrast to Guinea and, to a lesser extent French Soudan and Niger, the parties that led the other local governments in 1958 were dominated by conservative elements with a stake in the status quo. The most powerful party in Senegal, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), a PRA affiliate, was led by highly educated Ponty and French university graduates, wealthy peanut traders, leaders of the conservative Tidjaniya and Mouride Muslim brotherhoods, and government-appointed chiefs. Its secretary-general was Léopold Sédar Senghor, a poet and
grammarian with a French university degree. Although radical young intellectuals and trade unionists held important leadership positions, their leftist tendencies were counterbalanced by those of conservative forces. The Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)—the Ivorian branch of the RDA—grew out of the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA), an association of wealthy African coffee and cocoa planters, many of whom were chiefs. Although its membership was diverse, the PDCI was dominated by wealthy African planters, chiefs, and traders, as well as Ponty-educated elites. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a chief, planter, and Ponty-educated African doctor, was president of the SAA, the PDCI, and the interterritorial RDA.

In Upper Volta, the RDA-affiliated Parti Démocratique Unifié (PDU) was supported by conservative Catholic missions and was an amalgamation of parties dominated by young Western-educated intellectuals and conservative Mossi chiefs. The party was led by Ouëzzin Coulibaly, a Ponty-educated teacher, who in 1937 co-founded the first French West African trade union. Although leftist students in Paris and other radicals criticized the Voltaïque RDA for courting chiefly support, the RDA was too weak to come to power in 1957 without its traditionalist allies. In Mauritania, the Union Progressiste Mauritanienne (UPM) was dominated by chiefs, the Qadiriya Muslim brotherhood, and some Western-educated intellectuals. In May 1958, the UPM fused with the rival Entente Mauritanienne to form the Parti du Regroupement Mauritanien. The new party expelled radical youth who favored a “No” vote in the constitutional referendum.

Dahomey was divided between three regionally-based parties. Sourou Migan Apithy’s PRA-affiliated Parti Républicain du Dahomey (PRD) led by Christian intellectuals of the southeastern towns—particularly Apithy’s home town of Porto Novo—wealthy southern
merchants, and chiefs. Under pressure from the Catholic Church and the colonial administration, Apithy had broken with the RDA in 1948. It was not until 1955 that the RDA was able to establish another foothold in Dahomey. That year, its new affiliate, the Union Démocratique Dahoméenne (UDD), emerged in southwestern Dahomey, attracting young Western-educated elites, trade unionists, and urban Muslims resentful of their exclusion from Apithy’s party. The UDD was especially strong in the coastal towns of Cotonou and Ouidah, which rivaled Porto Novo for influence. The north was dominated by Hubert Maga’s Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen (RDD), a party that was strongly supported by government-appointed chiefs.

The Effectiveness of Grassroots Ethnic, Class, Gender, and Regional Alliances

The class base of its leadership was only one factor that influenced a party’s political orientation. The party’s definition of its constituency was another. Did the party purport to represent a particular ethnic, class, or regional grouping, or did it aspire to become a broad-based national alliance? Did it seek to mobilize and represent women, or did it consider political action to be purely a male affair? In most French West African territories, the dominant parties were ethnically or regionally-based and made little headway in mobilizing the non-elite population. With the exception of Guinea and French Soudan, the literature makes little or no reference to female participation. New research is needed to determine the extent of women’s involvement in the other postwar political movements.

The Guinean RDA, unlike its counterparts in most French West African territories, was avowedly nationalist, as well as anticolonial, in orientation. Although far from perfect, the party struggled to bridge ethnic, regional, class, and gender differences in order to shape a Guinean
national identity. It strove to build a multiethnic membership and made special appeals to women and to the lower classes in both the urban and rural areas. During electoral campaigns, the party sought to achieve ethnic and regional balance among its candidates and included women as well as men on the ballot. Women and men mobilized the population throughout the territory. The party’s strong grassroots women’s organization was led by market women, cloth-dyers, and seamstresses, rather than members of the Western-educated elite. Although it was vigorously opposed by Peul aristocrats in the Futa Jallon, who generally supported the Bloc Africain de Guinée (PRA), the Guinean RDA attracted a large following among Futa populations of slave descent and in low-status occupations. Although the alliance was periodically shaken by class tensions, gender conflict, and ethnically-based political violence, it survived and grew stronger as the referendum approached.²⁸

Most akin to the Guinean RDA in this regard was the Union Soudanaise, which also brought together a diverse ethnic and class alliance. Most of the party’s support came from the urban areas, where it was especially strong among trade unionists, including railway workers, teachers, and government clerks.²⁹ In the rural areas, the party mobilized the residents of the highly regulated farming centers run by the Office du Niger, where settlers growing rice and cotton for export agitated for a greater voice in decision-making.³⁰ It garnered significant among the Songhai and in Malinke regions, where resistance to French conquest had been particularly strong.³¹ Like its counterpart in Guinea, the Union Soudanaise’s egalitarian message appealed to people of slave descent and to those in low status occupations.³² However, in contrast to the Guinean RDA, the Union Soudanaise did not have a solid grassroots women’s organization. The women’s section was led by a small group of elite women, including the
In Niger, class, region, and ethnicity played prominent roles in determining party membership. While highly educated elites tended to support the Parti Progressiste Nigérien, the official RDA branch that had endorsed the split with the PCF, MSA/Sawaba focused on the lower classes. Its strongest support came from low-level civil servants, urban workers, petty traders, and artisans, as well as people of slave descent. By contrast with Guinea and French Soudan, women in Niger did not constitute a significant political force, as chiefs and other traditionalists successfully opposed their mobilization. Party allegiance was also influenced by regional and ethnic affiliation, with Hausa-speakers in southeastern Niger tending to support MSA/Sawaba, and Zerma/Songhai-speakers in the southwest favoring the Parti Progressiste Nigérien.

MSA/Sawaba, like the RDA branches in Guinea and French Soudan, struggled to build an inclusive national movement. However, its goals were hampered by strong ethnic identifications that transcended territorial boundaries and by the differential distribution of resources along ethnic lines in Niger. Hausa-speakers were by far the largest population group in Niger. With close economic and cultural ties to northern Nigeria, Hausa-speakers in Niger had more in common with their counterparts in that territory than with their countrymen in other parts of Niger. Their peanut production was responsible for most of the government’s export earnings, and they paid a disproportionate share of the territory’s taxes. However, few Hausa-speakers rose through the ranks of the colonial educational and civil service systems. Not surprisingly, disenchanted Hausa-speakers rallied to MSA/Sawaba’s egalitarian message, which
was promulgated by the radical trade unionist, Bakary Djibo. The territory’s second largest population group, the Songhai and its Zerma subgroup, were the greatest beneficiaries of colonial rule. They received more education and development assistance than the other population groups and dominated the colonial civil service. These relatively privileged groups rallied to the more conservative Nigerien RDA.40

In the Ivory Coast, as in Niger, ethnicity, region, and class were important determinants of party affiliation. The territory’s southeast was populated by the Baule and Agni peoples, many of whom had become wealthy coffee and cocoa planters and artisans during the colonial period.41 The impoverished north, in contrast, served as a labor reserve for the southern plantations.42 Because wealthy Baule and Agni planters could afford to send their children to school, the population in the southeast was generally better educated than populations in other parts of the territory. As a result, southeasterners tended to be disproportionately represented in the colonial civil service.43 During World War II, discriminatory policies in favor of French planters had prompted African coffee and cocoa producers to form an association to protect their interests. The resulting SAA was dominated by Baule planters, many of whom were chiefs, and Dioula trader-transporters from the northwest. After the war, the SAA became the backbone of the PDCI. Houphouët-Boigny, a Baule chief, planter, and Western-educated African doctor, was president of both bodies.44 While the Baule generally joined the PDCI, which was led by their patron, the Agni favored the Parti Progressiste de la Côte d’Ivoire, which was led by Agni educated elite and closely connected to the to Agni ethnic association.45

Like Niger, Upper Volta was sharply divided between east and west, with few cultural and economic bonds to hold it together. Just as Nigerien Hausa-speakers identified with Hausa-
speakers in northern Nigeria, rather than the Zerma/Songhai populations in their own territory, westerners in Upper Volta identified more strongly with populations in the Ivory Coast and French Soudan than with populations in the eastern part of the territory. Political affiliation was closely linked to ethnic and regional identity. The first RDA branch, the Parti Démocratique Voltaïque (PDV), maintained close ties to the PDCI in the Ivory Coast. Its stronghold was in the west, where the diverse population had long resisted the feudal authority of the eastern Mossi states. Its primary strength was in Bobo-Dioulasso, the territory’s economic hub. The PDV made little headway in the capital city of Ouagadougou and the eastern region, where Mossi chiefs were hostile to the party and tightly controlled their subjects. The dominant party in the east was the Parti Social d’Éducation des Masses Africaines (PSEMA), which was supported by both Mossi chiefs and Western-educated elites. In an attempt to form a truly national party, the PDV and PSEMA merged—rather uncomfortably—in 1956. The resulting PDU became Upper Volta’s official RDA branch in 1957 and won control of the new African-run local government. Despite its nationalist aspirations, the PDU was decidedly pro-Mossi in orientation, and Mossi chiefs had a strong voice in the new government.46

Dahomey, like most other French West African territories, was fraught with ethnic and regional divisions. While the territory’s major cleavage was between north and south, the south was also divided between rival towns and personalities. The populations in the north had greater cultural ties to the Zerma/Songhai in Niger and the Mossi in Upper Volta than to southern Dahomeans. In the northern region, Hubert Maga established the Groupement Éthnique du Nord, which subsequently formed the basis of the Mouvement Démocratique Dahoméen (MDD) and later, the RDD. Based largely on his personal prestige, Maga’s party did not campaign
outside his region of strength and relied on chiefs to get out the vote. In the south, Sourou Migan Apithy led the PRD, a regional party based primarily in the capital city of Porto-Novo, with further support in the rural southeast. The UDD, in turn, dominated southwestern Dahomey. Its strength lay in the coastal towns, particularly Cotonou—the territory’s commercial center—and Ouidah. Despite its regional base, the UDD aspired to be national party and attempted to organize party structures throughout the territory. However, it failed to make significant headway outside its original base and remained a regional party linked especially to the Fon ethnic group in Cotonou and the hinterland town of Abomey, which historically had ruled Cotonou. By end of the 1956, the UDD, like its northern and southeastern counterparts, was dominated by one personality—in this case, Justin Ahomadegbe, a canton chief who hailed from the Fon royal family of Abomey.47

The Strength of Party Organization and Democracy within Party Structures

French West African territories varied considerably in terms of the degree of party organization at the grassroots. In some territories, such as Mauritania, party structures were almost non-existent at the local level, and the population was barely mobilized.48 Guinea was at the other end of the spectrum. In no other territory were party cells so well established in urban neighborhoods and rural villages. Only in Guinea and, to a lesser extent, French Soudan, were local cells actively involved in decision-making and leaders held accountable to their membership through regular party congresses and elections.49 Elsewhere in the federation, power was concentrated at the top—either in the person of the party leader or among his close cohorts.
Modeling their party on the PCF, Guinean RDA activists strove to create party cells in every village and urban center. Women’s and youth committees were established at the village and neighborhood levels; enterprise committees were organized in businesses, industries, and on construction sites; craft and trade-related committees were created to attract fishermen, tailors, masons, and traders. By September 1958, the Guinean RDA included 4,300 local committees and 43 regional subsections. The Guinean RDA’s ultimate triumph was linked to the success of the committee structure, which permitted the party to address local problems and adapt to local realities while carrying out territorial and interterritorial programs. Regular meetings and democratic decision-making at all levels were encouraged to ensure the rapid transmission of information and concerns--from top to bottom and bottom to top.

In French Soudan, the Union Soudanaise also strove to establish regional subsections and village and neighborhood committees. However, it was not nearly as effective as the Guinean RDA in penetrating the rural areas and organizing down to the village level. In 1958, the Union Soudanaise had 56 subsections–but one-fifth of these were in Bamako, the capital city. Many of the others were in the administrative headquarters of their respective districts. Rarely were party cells effectively established in the villages. While delegates to the party congresses, who elected the party’s political bureau, were supposed to represent all of the subsections, most of the delegates to the 1958 party congress were residents of the capital city. The party’s board of directors, which took care of business between party congresses, was also heavily dominated by Bamako residents.

Local party structures were also weak in Niger, most notably in the rural areas where the chiefs held sway. In the early 1950s, the radical RDA-affiliated UDN had been the best
organized and most dynamic political party. It had a solid base among urban workers, including traders and transporters who retained strong rural ties, which permitted them to mobilize in their home areas. The UDN leader and CGT trade unionist, Bakary Djibo, had gained support in the eastern Hausa-speaking region, where he had encouraged peasant resistance to the chiefs. Yet, the UDN was not nearly as effective as the Guinean RDA in organizing the peasantry. Both Djibo and the UDN were expelled from the interterritorial RDA in 1955. The following year, the UDN formed a merger of convenience with the chiefs’ party, the BNA. Although they were now members of the same party, the chiefs worked hard to quash Djibo’s radical influence. With only weak structures at the local level, Djibo’s party was in no position to challenge the entrenched power of the chieftaincy in the rural areas.

In both Senegal and the Ivory Coast, party leaders concentrated power in their own hands and thwarted the establishment of a strong local organization. In Senegal, an older generation of Western-educated intellectuals, chiefs, Muslim religious leaders, clan heads, and wealthy peanut traders maintained tight control over the UPS and its rural constituency. The party was neither as democratic nor as well organized at the local level as the Guinean RDA. Although radical intellectuals and leftist trade unionists held important positions in the party’s political bureau, conservative party elders circumvented them when convenient. Similarly, in the Ivory Coast, the PDCI made little attempt to develop local party structures. Urban neighborhood committees were never established. Rather, preexisting ethnic associations were coopted and established as the party’s basic units, thus institutionalizing ethnic differences. The party was tightly controlled at the top by its president and his loyalists, who together selected the local leaders. Elections and
party congresses rarely occurred. Although there was significant discontent at the local level, grassroots activists were unable to harness it to effect a change of leadership or policies.\textsuperscript{61}

In Dahomey, Apithy’s and Maga’s parties were little more than electoral coalitions without clear objectives or policies. Run by Apithy and the elites of Porto-Novo, the PRD was inactive between elections and had no permanent organization until 1957. Like Apithy’s PRD in the southeast, Maga’s party (the MDD/RDD) was based on his personal prestige in the north. Neither man held electoral meetings outside his regional base. When the French law of May 23, 1951 greatly expanded the number of people eligible to vote in the overseas territories, tipping the balance from Western-educated urban elites to largely non-literate, rural voters, the number of voters in the previously neglected northern areas increased dramatically, bolstering the strength of the Maga’s party. Throughout the remainder of the decade, the chiefs were critical to the delivery of rural votes, and they whole-heartedly supported Maga. Although the UDD aspired to be a democratic national party like the Guinean RDA, electing leaders and establishing committees and subsections throughout the territory, like the PRD and the MDD/RDD, it was never more than a regional party dominated by one powerful personality.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{The Strength of the Colonial Chieftaincy}

In 1956, in response to its humiliating defeat in Indochina, war in Algeria, and widespread unrest elsewhere, France attempted to salvage what was left of its empire through a program of imperial reform.\textsuperscript{63} The result was a new legal framework or \textit{loi-cadre}, enacted on June 23, 1956, which authorized the French government to implement a series of legal reforms that would lead to limited self-government in the overseas territories.\textsuperscript{64} In Guinea, the RDA-dominated local government, established in May 1957, took advantage of its new powers to implement a
fundamental change in colonial administration. It abolished the institution of the canton chieftaincy, and in so doing, eliminated a longstanding obstacle to RDA success in the rural areas. None of the other local governments instituted such a radical policy. Government-appointed chiefs remained in place in all the other French West African territories, where they continued to wield immense power in favor of the colonial administration and, in 1958, the proposed constitution.

In Guinea and French Soudan, where canton chiefs had been extremely hostile to the RDA, the neutralization of their power was critical to the party’s success. In Guinea, two local government decrees divested the canton chiefs of their powers. The decree of December 11, 1957 abolished the 26 tribunals that had endowed the canton chiefs with judicial authority. This was followed by the decree of December 31, 1957, which abolished the canton chieftaincy altogether. These acts had enormous political ramifications. Throughout the 1950s, the chiefs had used their influence to manipulate elections to the detriment of the RDA. Rabidly hostile to the party and with significant coercive powers at the local level, the chiefs had thwarted RDA ascendancy in the rural areas for nearly a decade. Had they survived, the canton chiefs may well have forced a different outcome to the September 1958 referendum. In French Soudan, the defeat of government-supported chiefs was also a prerequisite for the Union Soudanaise’s electoral success in the rural areas. However, in French Soudan, the Union Soudanaise-dominated local government did not abolish the chieftaincy, which remained strong, especially in the savannah regions, and used its considerable influence to promote the 1958 constitution.

Most of the other dominant parties in French West Africa were beholden to the chiefs and other traditional elites. None of them followed the Guinean RDA’s lead. In Niger, chiefs and
emirs had considerable influence among the Hausa in the southeast, the Zerma/Songhai in the southwest, and the Tuareg in the north. Virginia Thompson writes that “...in 1957 and again in 1958 the chiefs demonstrated that they could still deliver the vote that unseated and made governments in Niger.” Although Bakary Djibo, as president of Niger’s local government, fired a number of recalcitrant chiefs, they were reinstated by the French governor just before the referendum. Djibo and his party clearly did not have the clout to do away with the chieftaincy altogether. In the Ivory Coast, the chiefs played a major role in PDCI leadership. Many village chiefs also were party secretaries. After the establishment of a PDCI-dominated local government in 1957, the party made no attempt to fundamentally transform local institutions. It made no move either to democratize the selection of chiefs through elections or to abolish the institution of the canton chieftaincy. Similarly, in Senegal, the UPS pledged to maintain the chiefs in the rural areas and actively sought their favor. In Upper Volta, Mossi chiefs remained a significant force in the east and retained strong control over their subjects. Chiefly support was critical for Dahomey’s two dominant parties, the PRD and the RDD. In Mauritania, chiefs in the south and emirs in the north had a strong hold on their populations. The 1951 franchise expansion in Mauritania, as elsewhere in the empire, benefitted the parties supported by the traditional rural elites.

The Referendum

By mid-1958, the wisdom, pace, and methods of the older generation were under attack. Throughout French West Africa, the rank and file of both the RDA and the PRA had become far more radical than the party leaders. Inspired by burgeoning independence movements elsewhere in Africa and in Asia, impatient young radicals increasingly pressed for more rapid and
fundamental change. While student, youth, and trade union organizations—all led by young men—increasingly called for independence, most of the parties’ highest officials favored local autonomy within the French-dominated community.72 By August 1958, pro-independence organizations had formed a united front to campaign against the proposed constitution, which fell far short of granting independence.73 Although most leaders of the major political parties ultimately weighed in for a “Yes” vote, the parties’ youth wings generally campaigned for a “No.”74

Parties affiliated with both the PRA and the RDA fractured along the left-right divide. At the PRA’s interterritorial congress, held in Cotonou on July 25-27, 1958, young leftists pushed through a resolution in favor of immediate independence—despite opposition from the interterritorial PRA’s president, Léopold Senghor. Among those who promoted the resolution were Bakary Djibo, who was elected PRA secretary-general at the Cotonou congress; Abdoulaye Ly, a former university student activist and Marxist intellectual from Senegal; and Abdoulaye Guèye, a Senegalese teacher and trade unionist.75 When the interterritorial PRA’s board of directors met in Niamey on September 14, it attempted to avert a breach by directing each territorial branch to determine its own position on the constitution. In the end, only the branches in Guinea and Niger supported a “No” vote, while those in Senegal, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and French Soudan endorsed a “Yes.”76 The interterritorial RDA divided along similar lines. By September 11, all of the RDA’s territorial branches except Guinea and Senegal had weighed in for a “Yes” vote. Waiting for Senegal’s PRA affiliate to state its position before making a final determination, the Senegalese RDA joined the ranks of the “Yes” voters on September 21.77
In Guinea, pressure for the “No” vote intensified. During its congress on September 4-7, the Guinean PRA officially opposed the constitution. On September 10-11, the Guinean RDA’s women’s and youth wings endorsed the “No” vote. On September 14, simultaneous with the interterritorial PRA meeting in Niamey, the Guinean RDA held a territorial congress in Conakry to determine its final position on the constitution. Some 680 Guinean RDA delegates, representing far flung village and neighborhood committees, regional subsections, and the party’s youth wing, converged on the capital to determine, through a democratic process, the party’s stance. The teachers’ union, with its relatively young membership, as well as students’ and youth organizations, were the driving force for the “No” vote. That evening, the Guinean RDA adopted a resolution in favor of immediate independence and a “No” vote in the referendum, officially breaking ranks with the interterritorial party. In Niger, Bakary Djibo immediately made public Sawaba’s position, which was identical to that of the Guinean RDA.

On September 16, Guinea’s local government announced the formation of a broad front for national independence that brought together the Guinean RDA and PRA, youth and military veterans’ associations, and UGTAN trade unions. Because the Guinean PRA had effectively dissolved itself when it joined forces with the ruling party, the Guinean RDA had become the only functioning party in the territory. The federal government in Dakar concluded that a “No” vote in Guinea was now certain. With the population so solidly behind the RDA, and because it lacked the support of the now defunct canton chiefs, the French government made no serious attempt to turn the election in Guinea.

In French Soudan, trade unionists and youth organizations, like their counterparts in Guinea, pressured the Union Soudanaise from the left. Before deciding to support the
constitutional project, the party engaged in an energetic internal debate. Modibo Kéïta and other leaders echoed Guinea’s critique of the proposed constitution. However, in the end, they endorsed the interterritorial RDA’s position and urged the population to vote “Yes.” Although it had ethnic and political links to Guinea, economically, French Soudan was tied to Senegal. Heavily dependent on the Dakar-Niger railway, the landlocked territory could not afford to alienate its powerful neighbor, which, under Senghor’s leadership, was rallying behind the “Yes.” Moreover, the rival Parti Progressiste Soudanais, a PRA affiliate supported by the chiefs and the colonial administration, strongly favored the constitution. Union Soudanaise leaders were not confident that their party’s local structures were strong enough to resist official pressures. Finally, given the presence of French military bases in the territory, party leaders worried that a “No” vote could result in military intervention and the overthrow of their local government. Although Modibo Kéïta finally agreed to follow the interterritorial party line and to urge the Soudanese population to do the same, he refused to pressure Sékou Touré to follow suit.  

Although both Sawaba and the Guinean RDA ultimately opposed the constitution, the situations on the ground in Niger and Guinea were enormously different. In contrast to Guinea, the rural population in Niger was barely mobilized. Throughout the 1950s, voter turnout was extremely low. In the March 1957 territorial elections, for instance, 73 percent of the Nigerien electorate failed to vote. Djibo and his party came to power in alliance with the chiefs, rather than in opposition to them, as was the case in Guinea. As a result, Djibo was the head of a weak coalition government in which conservative chiefs constantly worked to undermine progressive initiatives. The chiefs were particularly concerned that Djibo and his associates,
like their counterparts in Guinea, intended to abolish the institution of the chieftaincy. Hence, when Djibo announced that Sawaba would oppose the constitution, the chiefs, encouraged by the colonial administration, seceded from the party and began a vigorous campaign for a “Yes” vote.93

If the colonial administration made no serious attempt to turn the vote in Guinea, Niger was a different story. The May 1958 crisis in Algeria, which led to a narrowly-averted coup attempt in France, focused French security concerns on Niger. Strategically located on Algeria’s porous southern border, Niger served as a transfer point for weapons and money being funneled to Algerian rebels. If Niger rejected the constitution and claimed its independence, it might in the future serve as a base for rebel operations, threatening French control of Algeria and the Western Sahara.94 Moreover, uranium and other strategic resources had recently been discovered beneath Nigerien soil. France worried that a radical regime in Niger might provide these minerals to the Soviet Union, rather than the former imperial power. Finally, France feared the growing regional influence of anglophone Nigeria, whose large Hausa and Fulbe populations had strong ties to their counterparts in Niger. An independent Niger would undoubtedly strengthen Nigerian leverage in the region.95

Given Sawaba’s structural weaknesses, the French government saw an opportunity to alter the course of events. Virginia Thompson writes that in Niger, more than in any other French West African territory, external pressure was harnessed to influence the referendum results. A new governor, Don-Jean Colombani, arrived in Niamey on August 28, 1958, exactly one month before the referendum. He was instructed by his superiors to use every means necessary to undermine Sawaba’s anticipated call for a “No” vote. The governor, circle
commandants, and chiefs abandoned even the pretense of neutrality, distributing large sums of money and campaigning throughout the territory for the “Yes.” Peasants were warned that if they voted “No,” government subsidies would end, and peanut prices would plummet. (Senghor had warned Senegalese peasants of the same dire consequences.) During the weeks before the referendum, French troops were moved from the Algerian Sahara into Niger. Armored squadrons flew low over villages in Sawaba strongholds, and some 40,000 terrified villagers fled into Nigeria. On referendum day, soldiers and military-police were highly visible in the capital, which was in a virtual state of siege.96

In the Ivory Coast, as in Niger, coercion was employed to influence the referendum’s outcome. However, in the Ivory Coast the pressure was internal rather than external. As party leader and head of the local government, Houphouët-Boigny had collaborated closely with the colonial administration and with French business interests, alienating leftist intellectuals and trade unionists in the process. A significant number of Ivorian students, youths, civil servants, and trade unionists opposed the official party line but had little power to challenge it effectively. Concerned about the radicalism of the youth, the PDCI had refrained from creating a youth committee until just prior to the referendum—despite earlier instructions from the interterritorial RDA to do so. So tight was Houphouët-Boigny’s personal hold on the party that many leaders who privately disagreed with his position refused to break with him publicly.97 Even the Ivorian trade unions were quiescent. The local UGTAN branch chose to support the PDCI over the federal trade union body, which had endorsed the “No” vote, even though some unions, particularly those of civil servants, were sympathetic to the federal position.98
Despite the weakness of the opposition, Aristide Zolberg writes, “...the P.D.C.I. leaders believed that the sentiment for independence was widespread.” Disenchantment with PDCI policies, although not loudly spoken, was manifest in voter apathy. The March 1957 territorial elections, which had resulted in the establishment of the PDCI government, had been marked by weak voter participation. Although the 54.6 percent voter turnout was high compared to some territories, it was remarkably low for the home base of the interterritorial RDA. With few legitimate means to express their discontent, Ivorians had voted with their feet. Determined to produce an overwhelming endorsement of the constitution, Houphouët-Boigny’s government abandoned all pretense of free speech before the referendum and made it clear that abstentions would not be tolerated. In 1959, Zolberg’s informants—both PDCI leaders and their critics—spoke openly about the coercion used during the referendum campaign. While compliant voters were provided with free transportation to the polls, many who opposed the constitution were detained or exiled. Three weeks before the referendum, Houphouët-Boigny warned that anyone who attempted to sour relations with France had less than 24 hours to leave the territory.

In Senegal, opposition to the constitution was far more vocal that in the Ivory Coast. By the time the referendum took place, the UPS was deeply fractured. For several years, students, youths, and trade unionists had worked to weaken the power of religious and clan leaders and wealthy peanut traders—the backbone of the original party leadership. Radicals had gained a majority in the UPS political bureau and dominated the Senegalese delegation at the July 1958 PRA congress in Cotonou. While Senghor and his cohort called for a “Yes” vote, the UPS radicals pushed for a “No.” Circumventing the leftists in the political bureau, the party’s old guard called a meeting of the larger 154-member executive committee, which they persuaded to
support the constitution. On September 20, only eight days before referendum, the UPS executive committee officially endorsed the “Yes.” Infuriated by the maneuver, a number of UPS leftists resigned and formed a new party, PRA-Sénégal. In the eleventh hour, it joined two other small parties, composed primarily of young intellectuals and trade unionists, in campaigning for the “No” vote. While radicals in Guinea took over the dominant party and pushed it to the left, their counterparts in Senegal, unable to sway the principal party, abandoned it in disgust. Ironically, Senghor was not unsympathetic to the criticisms of the constitution, voiced by Bakary Djibo, Sékou Touré, and the UPS radicals. However, when forced to choose between the party’s left wing, on the one hand, and chiefs, Muslim religious leaders, peanut traders, and France, on the other, Senghor and his colleagues chose the latter. Not surprisingly, rural voters fell into line behind their longtime leaders—not a new party they barely knew. Had UPS leaders campaigned instead for the “No,” they were just as likely to have taken the majority with them.

The political leadership in Upper Volta, as in Senegal, sympathized with those who criticized the proposed constitution and yet, in the final analysis, called for a “Yes” vote. The local government was headed by Ouëzzin Coulibaly, the interterritorial RDA’s political director, who was personally close to both Houphouët-Boigny and Sékou Touré. Although critical of the constitution, Coulibaly was well aware of Upper Volta’s economic dependence on the Ivory Coast. The territory had little to export but labor, and each year it sent hundreds of thousands of laborers to Ivorian and other plantations. Upper Volta thus the need to remain in Houphouët-Boigny’s good graces. Moreover, Coulibaly’s party had come to power with the help of conservative chiefs. In any event, Coulibaly died in Paris on September 7, 1958–three weeks
before the referendum. Had he lived, some analysts have argued, Coulibaly might have convinced Sékou Touré to support the constitution in order to preserve RDA unity. Others have contended that Coulibaly, who was ideologically close to Sékou Touré, likewise would have called for a “No” vote—perhaps drawing other leaders away from the Houphouët fold. ¹⁰³ Proponents of the latter view, however, do not give sufficient weight to the PDU’s weakness at the grassroots and the strength of pro-government chiefs in the countryside. Nor do they take into account Coulibaly’s statement on August 31 that the constitutional project incorporated the RDA’s fundamental demands and that no party leader was entitled to make statements to the contrary. ¹⁰⁴

**The Results of the September 28, 1958 Constitutional Referendum**

The stage was set. By September 20, all of the governing parties in French West Africa, with the exception of those in Guinea and Niger, had called for a “Yes” vote. On September 28, voters throughout France and its empire went to the polls. In every French West African territory but Guinea and Niger, the constitution was approved by a staggering majority, with “Yes” votes ranging from 94 to 99.9 percent. ¹⁰⁵ In Niger, the constitution was approved by 75 percent, but only 37 percent of those registered actually voted. In Guinea, alone, the “No” vote carried. Of the 85 percent of registered voters who cast their ballots, 94 percent voted “No.” ¹⁰⁶

Given the strength of the “Yes” vote in most French West African territories, the magnitude of dissent in Niger is notable. One-quarter of those voting opposed the constitution. Even more significant is the fact that 63 percent of the registered electorate did not vote at all. In other words, the constitution was approved in a referendum in which only 37 percent of the registered voters chose to participate. Voter turnout in Niger was the lowest in French West
Although voter intimidation may well have influenced the turnout, the results in Niger also demonstrated a general failure of political mobilization. While Bakary Djibo and his party were unable to rally the majority of the population against the constitution, the chiefs and their allies did little better in mustering positive support.

Voter response in French Soudan and Dahomey were also tepid. Although 97 percent of Soudanese voters approved the constitution, only 45 percent of the registered electorate turned out to vote. Given that French Soudan was reputed to be one of the better organized territories in French West Africa, and given the heated internal debate about the party’s final disposition on the constitution, the low turnout may well have been due to voter discontent with the party line. Similarly, in Dahomey, while 97 percent of the voters favored the constitution, only 56 percent of the registered electorate went to the polls.

Voter turnout was significantly higher in the remaining French West African territories. In Senegal, where the population was relatively well-organized, 80 percent of the electorate participated in the referendum, and 98 percent favored the constitution. In other territories, known for their lack of popular mobilization, the official figures were suspiciously high. In Mauritania, where the local population had demonstrated little previous political involvement, 84 percent of the registered voters supposedly went to the polls. Of these, 94 percent supported the constitution. In Upper Volta, another territory with weak party organization, 75 percent of the registered voters allegedly participated in the referendum, and 98.9 percent voted for the constitution. In the Ivory Coast, where abstentions were prohibited, 98 percent of the registered voters reportedly cast their ballots on referendum day, and 99.9 percent of these voted in favor of
the constitution. According to the rather dubious official tally, out of 1.6 million voters, only 216 Ivorians voted against the constitution.¹⁰⁹

**Conclusion**

Focusing on the eight territories of French West Africa, this article has argued that several factors account for the Guinean RDA’s unique position on the September 1958 constitutional referendum. The Guinean RDA differed from other dominant parties in French West Africa in terms of the class base of its leadership, the effectiveness of its grassroots ethnic, class, gender, and regional alliances, the strength of its organization at the local level, and the degree of popular participation in party decisions. A final variable was the relative power of the colonial chieftaincy in Guinea and other French West African territories. The Guinean RDA was led by second-tier elites—low-level civil servants and trade unionists—while varying combinations of wealthy traders, planters, religious leaders, and chiefs tended to dominate the principal parties in other territories. The Guinean RDA, to a far greater extent than its counterparts in other territories, had developed a broad-based national alliance and effective party structures down to the lowest levels. Not only was the population highly mobilized, it had a great deal of input into party decisions and the selection of party leaders. The Guinean RDA was virtually unique in this regard. Finally, Guinea’s local government had abolished the institution of the canton chieftaincy in late 1957. In every other territory, conservative chiefs remained in place, throwing their weight behind the policies of the colonial administration. These factors account for the Guinean RDA’s political radicalism, its singular claim for immediate independence in 1958, and its ability to mobilize the population toward that end.
Why should we be concerned with the Guinean case, a half century after the fact? Because it provides an analytical framework that allows us to understand other political movements and to generalize more broadly. An assessment of the four factors that made the Guinean RDA stand apart—the class base of party leadership, the breadth and effectiveness of internal alliances, the strength of party organization at the grassroots, and the degree of popular participation in party decisions—can help us to predict the success or failure of political movements in other times and places.

This said, a cautionary note is in order. Whether the diverse alliances necessary to bring about the immediate goal are strong enough to withstand internal fissures once the original objective has been achieved is another topic of investigation. In Guinea, the government crackdown on dissenting trade unionists and intellectuals after independence was foreshadowed by the RDA’s increasing intolerance of dissent after the establishment of Guinea’s local government in May 1957.\textsuperscript{110} The emergence of a one-party state also had its roots in the waning years of colonization. The RDA’s electoral victories in 1956 and 1957 had emptied Guinea’s governing bodies of most political rivals, and in September 1958, the only remaining opposition party effectively dissolved itself, joining forces with the Guinean RDA to oppose the constitution.\textsuperscript{111} External pressures can also tip the balance. Foreign intervention in Guinea, stimulated both by imperial and Cold War concerns, undermined nation-building efforts and helped to propel the popular democratic movement toward intolerance and dictatorship.\textsuperscript{112} Thus, the Guinean case provides tools, rather than a blueprint. Used judiciously, these tools can illuminate the workings of other political movements, past and present, and bring us to a more global understanding of their successes and failures.
1. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously announced that “the wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.” Independent nations were bound to emerge, and European powers needed to accept this fact and adapt their policies accordingly. Quoted in Frank Myers, “Harold Macmillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 2000), 556, 559, 564-565.


Press, 2007); Elizabeth Schmidt, “Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization
Reconsidered, With Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa),” American Historical
Review, vol. 110, no. 4 (October 2005), 975-1014; Elizabeth Schmidt, “Cold War in Guinea: the
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the Struggle over Communism, 1950-1958,” Journal
of African History, vol. 48, no. 1 (March 2007), 95-121; Elizabeth Schmidt, “‘Emancipate Your
Husbands!’: Women and Nationalism in Guinea, 1953-1958,’ in Women in African Colonial
Histories, eds. Jean Allman, Susan Geiger, and Nakanyike Musisi (Bloomington: Indiana

5. While a number of studies have explored Guinea’s descent into dictatorship and
repression in the post-independence period, none has examined the processes by which the
Guinean RDA was transformed from a highly democratic mass party to the ultimate source of
power in a repressive authoritarian state. For the post-independence period, see L. Gray Cowan,
Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1964), 186-215; Bernard Charles, Guinée (Lausanne, Éditions
Recontre, 1963); B. Ameillon, La Guinée: Bilan d'une Indépendance (Paris: François Maspero,
277 (Oct. 1970), 350-365; Sylvain Soriba Camara, La Guinée sans La France (Paris: Presses de
la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976); ’Ladipo Adamolekun, Sékou Touré’s
Guinea: An Experiment in Nation Building (London: Methuen, 1976); Claude Rivière, Guinea:
Research for this article was conducted at the Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS) in Dakar, the Archives de Guinée (AG) in Conakry, the Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Africaine (CRDA) in Paris, and the Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer, Archives Nationales (de France) (CAOM) in Aix-en-Provence. Unless otherwise indicated, I translated all French language sources and conducted all interviews in collaboration with Siba N. Grovogui.

At its second party congress in October 1950, the Guinean RDA officially assumed the name “Parti Démocratique de Guinée” (PDG). However, Guineans generally continued to refer to their local branch as “the RDA.” It was only after independence in 1958, and Guinea’s disaffiliation from the interterritorial RDA, that the appellation “PDG” took root. ANS, 17G573, Guinée Française, Services de Police, Conakry, "Compte-Rendu de la Réunion Publique du Parti Démocratique de Guinée Française (P.D.G.)--Ex-R.D.A.--tenue au Domicile d'Amara Soumah le 24 Octobre 1950 de 18h30 à 20 heures," 25 Oct. 1950, #1248/221, C/PS/BM; Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, Le P.D.G.: Artisan de l'Indépendance Nationale en Guinée (1947-1958) (Conakry: I.N.R.D.G., Bibliothèque Nationale, 1978), 1: 238-239.

See Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses, chapters 1-4.

There were RDA affiliates in the Ivory Coast, Guinea, French Soudan, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Chad, Gabon, and the Congo, as well as in the United Nation trust territories of Togo and Cameroon. Morgenthau, Political Parties, 88-90; Mortimer, France and


18. Morgenthau, Political Parties, 14, 19, 22, 271-272, 275, 277-279, 281, 286, 289-290, 299; Mortimer, France and the Africans, 64-65; Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 31; Snyder, One-Party Government in Mali, 19, 47.


28. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*; Schmidt, “Emancipate Your Husbands.”


African military veterans were a partial exception to this generalization. Although a significant number of veterans were of slave descent, they were split in terms of political allegiance. Mann argues that career soldiers and World War I veterans tended to support the Parti Progressiste Soudanais, which was favored by the colonial administration and the chiefs, while conscripts and World War II veterans tended to support the Union Soudanais. In the 1958 referendum, Soudanese veterans generally opposed political independence, which they feared would jeopardize their pensions and other benefits accrued from France. Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 4, 22-24, 52-53, 110, 127, 134, 136, 138.


Most of the French West Africa leaders who campaigned for the “No” vote were connected to the Union Générale des Travailleurs d’Afrique Noire (UGTAN), a federal trade union body whose strongest constituent movement was the CGT. These leaders included Sékou Touré in Guinea, Bakary Djibo in Niger, Abdoulaye Guèye and Alioune Cissé in Senegal, and Abdoulaye Diallo in French Soudan. Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 317-318; Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets*, 2: 292.


The Guinean PRA officially disbanded on November 29, 1958, when party leaders instructed their followers to join the PDG (Guinean RDA). Du Bois, *Guinean Vote for Independence*, 8.


Once the decision for a “Yes” vote was made, Soudanese activists generally fell into line behind party leaders. While the local UGTAN branch supported the interterritorial body’s call for a “No” vote, it did not publicly disavow the Union Soudanaise position. In fact, Labor Minister Abdoulaye Diallo was the only Soudanese trade union leader to break ranks and publicly advocate a “No” vote. Hodgkin and Morgenthau, “Mali,” 239; Wallerstein, “How Seven States Were Born,” 12.


104. Chaffard and de Benoist claim that Sékou Touré took umbrage at Coulibaly’s remarks, believing that they were directed at him personally, and refused to attend Coulibaly’s funeral. Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets*, 2: 204-5; de Benoist, *L’Afrique Occidentale Française*, 420-21.

105. Morgenthau’s figures, cited throughout this section, are taken from *Outre-mer 1958*, which was published by the French government’s Services Statistiques d’Outre-mer. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, 369, 399. See also Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 323-324.


111. Kéïta, P.D.G., 2: 166, 190-191; Suret-Canale, République de Guinée, 172; Du Bois, Guinean Vote for Independence, 6, 8.